On Fri, Nov 23, 2012 at 1:39 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 23, 2012 Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > I wonder if your disagreement stems from different concepts of a self >> sampling assumption Absolute Self Sampling Assumption (ASSA) vs. Relative >> Self Sampling Assumption (RSSA). >> > > I don't know which assumption is better and I don't see how it matters, at > least not now at our current state of ignorance. Nobody knows how many > observers are possible, and even if we did nobody knows how many of those > possible observers actually exist. I do know that in a thought experiment > where lots of exact and near exact copies of John Clark are running around > and somebody asks "what will "you" see?" it's rather helpful to know who > the hell the pronoun refers to; Bruno says "you" refers to the Helsinki man > but it's clear he doesn't mean it because in his next breath he says the > Helsinki man is the Moscow man AND the Helsinki man is the Moscow man but > "you" will not see Helsinki and Moscow. So who is "you"? > > > Then again, perhaps John goes even further than ASSA or RSSA, in that he >> (at least at times) appears to deny any interrelation or continuation >> between observer moments, treating the H-man, W-man, and M-man as entirely >> independent observer moments >> > > There is a connection from the present to the past in that both the W-man > and M-man emember being the H-man and thus both are the H-man. However > there is no connection from the present to the future because the W-man and > the M-man don't know what the other is thinking seeing or doing and thus > are not each other and have become separate people. > But according to computationalism your conscious moment is attached to some computer program, and computer programs progress until they halt. Therefore you could identify the future self as at least one of the natural progressions of any program going through a state which results in your current experience. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
