On Nov 25, 2012, at 12:29 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
On 11/24/2012 4:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Nov 24, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]>
wrote:
On 11/24/2012 10:52 AM, John Clark wrote:
But consider what would happen before they open the boxes. Bruno
Marchal is exactly duplicated and one copy
materializes in Washington and the other in Moscow
but both are inside identical boxes. If the position of the two
were then instantaneously exchanged Bruno Marchal could not tell
the difference and even "you" could not tell the difference using
any definition of "you" that can be thought of.
What's more even a third party, even the very universe itself
would not change one bit if you instantaneously exchanged those 2
identical things.
But strictly speaking they cannot be identical. For example it is
statistically certain that they will be thinking different thoughts
as they revive from the transport. The no-cloning theorem already
ensures that they cannot be identical at the level of quantum state
and the very interactions with the environment that make them quasi-
classical will ensure they are not identical even at a much higher
level than the molecular. I'm not sure how this affects Bruno's
argument, but it is different from the 'duplication' in Everett's
MWI of QM.
We may be unable to prepare to quantum systems to be in such a
state, but if the universe is infinite in size, then we might
expect it to be statistically guaranteed that disparate systems
converge to identical quantum states.
But the argument seems to rest on states *diverging*.
Sure. But is it not highly likely for any converged quantum states to
later diverge?
Jason
Brent
As for how it might effect Bruno's thought experiment, we could
avoid the issue of non-clonability by duplicating "uploaded" minds
rather than ones supported by biological substrates.
Jason
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected]
.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]
.
For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
.
--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [email protected].
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
[email protected].
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
