On 11/24/2012 4:22 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
On Sat, Nov 24, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
On 11/24/2012 10:52 AM, John Clark wrote:
But consider what would happen before they open the boxes. Bruno Marchal is
exactly
duplicated and one copy materializes in Washington and the other in Moscow
but both
are inside identical boxes. If the position of the two were then
instantaneously
exchanged Bruno Marchal could not tell the difference and even "you" could
not tell
the difference using any definition of "you" that can be thought of. What's
more
even a third party, even the very universe itself would not change one bit
if you
instantaneously exchanged those 2 identical things.
But strictly speaking they cannot be identical. For example it is
statistically
certain that they will be thinking different thoughts as they revive from
the
transport. The no-cloning theorem already ensures that they cannot be
identical at
the level of quantum state and the very interactions with the environment
that make
them quasi-classical will ensure they are not identical even at a much
higher level
than the molecular. I'm not sure how this affects Bruno's argument, but it
is
different from the 'duplication' in Everett's MWI of QM.
We may be unable to prepare to quantum systems to be in such a state, but if the
universe is infinite in size, then we might expect it to be statistically guaranteed
that disparate systems converge to identical quantum states.
But the argument seems to rest on states *diverging*.
Brent
As for how it might effect Bruno's thought experiment, we could avoid the issue of
non-clonability by duplicating "uploaded" minds rather than ones supported by biological
substrates.
Jason
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