On Fri, Nov 23, 2012 at 3:52 PM, John Clark <johnkcl...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 23, 2012 at 2:32 PM, Jason Resch <jasonre...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > But according to computationalism your conscious moment is attached to
>> some computer program, and computer programs progress until they halt.
> And a computer program is constantly changing so consciousness is
> constantly changing too, and that's a good thing because a static
> consciousness is no consciousness at all.
> > Therefore you could identify the future self as at least one of the
>> natural progressions of any program going through a state which results in
>> your current experience.
> You can identify your past state as one that produced your present state,
> but it's hard to identify with your future state when you don't know what
> it will be.
I don't see why one's knowledge (partial or complete) is required to
identify with something. Indeed, we can never have perfect knowledge of
what we are, but perhaps we can say "I am some program", and "My next
experience will be that of the future evolution of this program" even when
we don't know what program that is. After all, we require some theory of
prediction if we are to justify our decisions.
> That's why predicting isn't as good as remembering
I disagree. In some contexts memory is more reliable than prediction but
not in all. I would put more faith in the sun rising next morning than in
my correct recalling of what I ate for breakfast last week.
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