On 11/25/2012 6:02 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Nov 2012, at 01:22, Jason Resch wrote:

On Sat, Nov 24, 2012 at 5:15 PM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    On 11/24/2012 10:52 AM, John Clark wrote:
    But consider what would happen before they open the boxes. Bruno Marchal is
    exactly duplicated and one copy materializes in Washington and the other in 
    but both are inside identical boxes. If the position of the two were then
    instantaneously exchanged Bruno Marchal could not tell the difference and 
    "you" could not tell the difference using any definition of "you" that can 
    thought of. What's more even a third party, even the very universe itself 
    not change one bit if you instantaneously exchanged those 2 identical 

    But strictly speaking they cannot be identical.  For example it is 
    certain that they will be thinking different thoughts as they revive from 
    transport.  The no-cloning theorem already ensures that they cannot be 
identical at
    the level of quantum state and the very interactions with the environment 
that make
    them quasi-classical will ensure they are not identical even at a much 
higher level
    than the molecular.  I'm not sure how this affects Bruno's argument, but it 
    different from the 'duplication' in Everett's MWI of QM.

We may be unable to prepare to quantum systems to be in such a state, but if the universe is infinite in size, then we might expect it to be statistically guaranteed that disparate systems converge to identical quantum states.

As for how it might effect Bruno's thought experiment, we could avoid the issue of non-clonability by duplicating "uploaded" minds rather than ones supported by biological substrates.

Yes. If QM could be used through the cloning theorem, it can only mean that comp is false. Once we are Turing emulable (which is still the case with a quantum brain, despite the non cloning theorem), we know that the UD will "prepare" the exact state infinitely often. And then comp explains why the comp apparent "primitive matter" is non clonable, as it is defined by an infinity of competing universal numbers/histories.

An arbitrary quantum state can't be cloned because of linearity. I don't see what this has to do with the "infinity of competing universal numbers/histories".


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