On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 2:30 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote: > On 1/4/2013 6:23 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote: >> >> On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:48 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> >> wrote: >>> >>> On 1/4/2013 8:31 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Richard, >>>>>> >>>>>> I will take a look, but I confess to being a bit skeptical of any >>>>>> substantist theory... How can substances communicate with each other >>>>>> representationally? >>>> >>>> Sorry but I do not understand what this last sentence means. BECs >>>> certainly can copy each others configurations. >>>> >>> Hi Richard, >>> >>> This ability to "copy each others configuration" , does it give us >>> some >>> thing like "representability"? What does "representability" mean to you? >> >> Well in the Consciousness Canonizer my string consciousness model is >> listed or categorized under "Representational Qualia Theory" but I do >> not really have an appreciation for what that means >> >> The Stanford Encyl has an article on Representational Theories of >> Consciousness which says that intentionality is representation??? >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-representational/ >> >> That defines a word in terms of another word that I do not understand- >> a problem I often have on this list. However further into the article >> is a clarifying sentence: >> >> " Like public, social cases of representation such as writing or >> mapmaking, intentional states such as beliefs have truth-value; they >> entail or imply other beliefs; they are (it seems) composed of >> concepts and depend for their truth on a match between their internal >> structures and the way the world is; and so it is natural to regard >> their aboutness as a matter of mental referring or designation. " >> >> So I conclude that this is quite different issue from one BEC copying >> what exists in another BEC. > > > Hi Richard, > > Yes. Copying states and representing states are not the same thing. > >> >> Representionality is closer to IMO Godelian incompleteness or >> Marchal's CTM wherein beliefs and truth, etc. can be represented. I do >> not know how. > > > Representations are "about" things, they are not themselves things in > the physical sense and yet physical processes can act as media on which > representations can be rendered. Representations are strange in that they > can be about other representations, even themselves. It is this property, > more than any other, that distinguished minds from bodies. > >> But my conjecture is that whatever representations exist in the CTM >> BEC of string theory can be copied into the BEC of (human brain) >> physical consciousness, and vice versa. This is essentially a >> mind/body duality. >> Richard >> > > yes, this does straight to the mind-body problem. I am proposing a > solution to it that is different from Bruno's (and can subsume Bruno's > idea), it is dual aspect monism. Minds and bodies are two distinct aspects > of one and the same neutral oneness of all that exists. Vaughan Pratt > explains this in his paper: http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen >
On reading Pratt it appears that he elevates mind/body duality to a TOE. But I have not read in sufficient depth, assuming that is possible for me, to know if that is true. Richard > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
