On Sat, Jan 5, 2013 at 2:30 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net> wrote:
> On 1/4/2013 6:23 PM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>> On Fri, Jan 4, 2013 at 4:48 PM, Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>>> On 1/4/2013 8:31 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote:
>>>>> Hi Richard,
>>>>>> I will take a look, but I confess to being a bit skeptical of any
>>>>>> substantist theory... How can substances communicate with each other
>>>> Sorry but I do not understand what this last sentence means. BECs
>>>> certainly can copy each others configurations.
>>> Hi Richard,
>>> This ability to "copy each others configuration" , does it give us
>>> thing like "representability"? What does "representability" mean to you?
>> Well in the Consciousness Canonizer my string consciousness model is
>> listed or categorized under "Representational Qualia Theory" but I do
>> not really have an appreciation for what that means
>> The Stanford Encyl has an article on Representational Theories of
>> Consciousness which says that intentionality is representation???
>> That defines a word in terms of another word that I do not understand-
>> a problem I often have on this list. However further into the article
>> is a clarifying sentence:
>> " Like public, social cases of representation such as writing or
>> mapmaking, intentional states such as beliefs have truth-value; they
>> entail or imply other beliefs; they are (it seems) composed of
>> concepts and depend for their truth on a match between their internal
>> structures and the way the world is; and so it is natural to regard
>> their aboutness as a matter of mental referring or designation. "
>> So I conclude that this is quite different issue from one BEC copying
>> what exists in another BEC.
> Hi Richard,
> Yes. Copying states and representing states are not the same thing.
>> Representionality is closer to IMO Godelian incompleteness or
>> Marchal's CTM wherein beliefs and truth, etc. can be represented. I do
>> not know how.
> Representations are "about" things, they are not themselves things in
> the physical sense and yet physical processes can act as media on which
> representations can be rendered. Representations are strange in that they
> can be about other representations, even themselves. It is this property,
> more than any other, that distinguished minds from bodies.
>> But my conjecture is that whatever representations exist in the CTM
>> BEC of string theory can be copied into the BEC of (human brain)
>> physical consciousness, and vice versa. This is essentially a
>> mind/body duality.
> yes, this does straight to the mind-body problem. I am proposing a
> solution to it that is different from Bruno's (and can subsume Bruno's
> idea), it is dual aspect monism. Minds and bodies are two distinct aspects
> of one and the same neutral oneness of all that exists. Vaughan Pratt
> explains this in his paper: http://boole.stanford.edu/pub/ratmech.pdf
On reading Pratt it appears that he elevates mind/body duality to a TOE.
But I have not read in sufficient depth, assuming that is possible for
me, to know if that is true.
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