On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 12:01 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > On 09 Jan 2013, at 16:17, Richard Ruquist wrote: > >> On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 10:05 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> >>> On 09 Jan 2013, at 12:35, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 9, 2013 at 5:09 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 08 Jan 2013, at 15:59, Roger Clough wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi Bruno Marchal >>>>>> >>>>>> Whoever invented the word "God" invented atheism. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Not necessarily. The modern notion of God comes with the platonist, and >>>>> was >>>>> almost a synonym with "truth". There was an implicit, but reasonable >>>>> assumption, that humans search truth. Atheism has arised by reaction to >>>>> *imposed* notion of God, and, unfortunately, throws the "theology" baby >>>>> with >>>>> the clerical bath water. >>>>> Before, God was a scientific hypothesis, more or less equivalent with >>>>> the >>>>> idea that there is a reality which transcend us. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> Agreed but your next statement is too restrictive in my opinion unless >>>> you mean experimental proof. For sure there is arithmetic proof that >>>> goes beyond experimental proof in scope. >>> >>> >>> >>> I prefer to keep the term "proof" in the strong logician's sense (formal >>> or >>> informal). >>> I would talk only on experimental *evidence*. >>> >>> You are right that proof usually can go much farer than any evidence. We >>> know that there is a prime number bigger than 10^10000, but have no >>> experimental evidences at all for that! >>> >>> But I am saying something stronger: that many arithmetical truth are just >>> beyond proof (not just beyond experimental evidence). The simplest one is >>> the consistency of PA, which is true but impossible to be proven by PA. >>> Note >>> that by the *completeness theorem* (Gödel 1930), consistency is >>> equivalent >>> with "having a model", or having a (mathematical) reality satisfying the >>> axioms. Self-consistency is already an assertion, made by some machine, >>> that >>> there is a transcendental (with respect to that machine) reality. >> >> >> Agreed, and I hope that truth is true . > > > Lol. > > > >> >> Can we say that physical particles are often localised volumes >> that are full of "infinities of discrete number relations" > > > Sounds to much physicalist for me (or comp). > > > >> and that a "flux density of infinities" can flow between them. >> Or is that overboard? > > > If not taken literally, it can perhaps help. But there is a risk of reifying > the particles, or of interpreting the "flux densities of infinities" in a > too much materialist sense.
But Bruno, you just said that matter came from "infinities of discrete number relations" > If you compensate with "matrix-" or "simulacron"-like illustration, that > will be OK. You need to get the familiarity with the idea that those > infinities of computations exists in arithmetic, and that it becomes "matter > appearances" only from the "number's pov" as distributed on the whole UD* or > (sigma_1) arithmetical truth. > > I can find that rather weird too. In the beginning I thought that this was > just some steps toward a refutation of comp, but like with the Gödelian > argument against mechanism, when made precise enough, the machine turns such > argument in favor of comp. > > I would never have found comp plausible if there were not the strong > evidence given by Gödel's theorem, Church thesis and QM. And of course, > *many* problem are far from being solved (to say the least), but at least we > have the tools to formulate them precisely. > > Bruno > Are you granting that QM laws are arithmetic theorems on the level as those of Godel and Church? So you can argue from them like they were axioms? Richard > >> Richard >> points and lines >> word geometry? > > > > > > > > >> Richard >> >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> Richard >>>> >>>>> By definition it cannot be >>>>> proved to exist, not even named. Exactly like "arithmetical truth" has >>>>> to >>>>> appear for any sound machine. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> [Roger Clough], [[email protected]] >>>>>> 1/8/2013 >>>>>> "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen >>>>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>>>> From: Bruno Marchal >>>>>> Receiver: everything-list >>>>>> Time: 2013-01-08, 09:52:18 >>>>>> Subject: Re: Science is a religion by itself. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On 07 Jan 2013, at 19:47, John Clark wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Mon, Jan 7, 2013 wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>>> Consider God, a word for Mind >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> OK, I have a mind therefore I am God. >>>>>> >>>>>> I said it before I'll say it again, for some strange reason that is >>>>>> unknown to me many people are willing to abandon the idea of God but >>>>>> not >>>>>> the >>>>>> word G-O-D. Those letters and in that sequence (DOG just will not do) >>>>>> MUST >>>>>> be preserved and it doesn't matter what it means. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> GOD means the reality in which you believe. It is, imo, a bit more >>>>>> neutral >>>>>> than "Universe", which is the third Aristotelian God, and which does >>>>>> not >>>>>> belong to what constitutes the "being" for the Platonist. Since about >>>>>> 1500 >>>>>> years, the term "God" has acquired many christian cultural colors, but >>>>>> there >>>>>> is no reason to identify God with the God-father of Christian >>>>>> "theory". >>>>>> God >>>>>> has no name, in many theologies, so all terms to designate it can only >>>>>> be a >>>>>> fuzzy pointer. Tao is not bad, as it has many similar qualities than >>>>>> the >>>>>> abramanic god, but with a less "person" feature. I use the term God to >>>>>> designate whatever transcend us and is responsible for our existence. >>>>>> With >>>>>> comp, I am open to the idea that (arithmetical) truth can play that >>>>>> role, >>>>>> and this is exploited in the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus >>>>>> 'neoplatonism'. >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> Bruno >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>>> >>>>>> -- >>>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>>> Groups >>>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>>> [email protected]. >>>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups >>>>> "Everything List" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> [email protected]. >>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups >>>> "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> [email protected]. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>> >>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >>> "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> [email protected]. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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