On 18 Jan 2013, at 13:29, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Russell Standish

Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, positively and without reference to anything else.

This can make sense. We can relate this with the common notion of subjectivity.


Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, with respect to a second but regardless of any third.

Hmm... Why not, but I don't see this as fundamental. It can be distracting.


Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is, in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."

OK. Then with comp "thirdness" is arithmetic (and physics is, counter- intuitively, still 1p, hopefully plural). The physical is a mode of being which is *not* such as it is.

Bruno




I believe 1p is Firstness (raw experience of cat) + Secondness (identification of the image "cat" with the word "cast" to oneself)
and 3p = Thirdness (expression of "cat" to others)


[Roger Clough], [rclo...@verizon.net]



Peirce
Peirce, being a pragmatist, described perception according to what happened
at each stage,1/18/2013
"Forever is a long time, especially near the end." - Woody Allen
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Russell Standish
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-01-17, 17:17:11
Subject: Re: Re: Escaping from the world of 3p Flatland


Hi John,

My suspicion is that Roger is so keen to impose a Piercean triadic
view on things that he has omitted to make the necessary connection
with the normal meaning of 1p/3p as standing for subjective/objective.

Cheers

On Tue, Jan 15, 2013 at 04:55:17PM -0500, John Mikes wrote:
Russell,
I reflect after a long-long time to your post. I had a war on my hand about objective and subjective, fighting for the latter, since we are 'us' and cannot be 'them'. I never elevated to the mindset of Lady Welby 1904, who -
maybe? - got it what 2p was.
My vocabulary allows me to consider what "I consider" (=1p) and I may
communicat it (still 1p) to anybody else, who receives it as a 3p
communication and acknowledges it into HIS 1p way adjusted and reformed into it. There is no other situation I can figure. Whatever I 'read' or 'hear' is 3p for me and I do the above to it to get it into my 1p mindset.
No 2p to my knowledge. Could you improve upon my ignorance?
John Mikes

On Sat, Dec 29, 2012 at 1:21 AM, Russell Standish wrote:

On Fri, Dec 28, 2012 at 08:29:52AM -0500, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Russell Standish

2p should be a necessary part of comp, espcially if it uses synthetic
logic.
It doesn't seem to be needed for deductive logic, however.

The following equivalences should hold between comp
and Peirce's logical categories:

3p = Thirdness or III
2p = Secondness or II
1p = Firstness or I.

Comp seems to only use analytic or deductive logic,
while Peirce's categories are epistemological (synthetic
logic) categories, in which secondness is an integral part.
So .

Here's what Peirce has to say about his categorioes:

http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/secondness.html


"Firstness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
positively and without reference to anything else.

Secondness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
with respect to a second but regardless of any third.

Thirdness is the mode of being of that which is such as it is,
in bringing a second and third into relation to each other."
(A Letter to Lady Welby, CP 8.328, 1904)"


Thanks for the definition, but how does that relate to 1p and 3p? I
cannot see anything in the definitions of firstness and thirdness that
relate to subjectivity and objectivity.

As I said before, I do not even know what 2p could be.


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