On 1/22/2013 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 21 Jan 2013, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 1/21/2013 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
If you don't take arithmetic as primitive, I can prove that you
cannot derive both addition and multiplication, nor the existence of
computer. Then everything around me does not make sense. If you
believe you can derive them, then do it. But you proceed like a
literary philosophers, so I have doubt you can derive addition and
multiplication in the sense I would wait for.
Is this statement correctly written? How is it coherent that I
need to derive from arithmetic that which is already in arithmetic?
Stephen, you are the one telling me that you don't assume the numbers,
so it is normal that I ask you how you derive them form what you assume.
I will differ to David Chalmers work to demonstrate a thorough
demolition of materialism. I see numbers are an aspect of mental content
and not independently existing entities, so we have an irreconcilable
difference in our thinking.
It seems to me that the physical activity of counting is the source
of derivation of arithmetics!
But you have to derive the physical activity first, then.
I no longer see the utility of trying to prove the existence of the
content of 1p experience. I experience it and can bet that you do as
well. That is my theory of a physical world and its activity in a nutshell.
Of cource we cannot just consider the activity of a single entity but
that of many entities, each counting in their own ways and developing
communication methods between themselves.
Materialism fails since it cannot explain how it is possible for
material things to have representations of things, intensionality,
such as numbers.
yes, even weak materialism. But your point is not valid, unless you
prove it first.
What benefit comes from this "proof"?
Numbers fail, as a ground of ontology, as they can not transform
themselves and remain the same. Matter is exactly that which can
transform and remain the same!
? (looks like a prose to me).
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