On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 6:03:58 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote: > > Hi Stephen, > > Numbers do have an independent existence, that > being nonphysical existence. >
Then so does Mickey Mouse have a nonphysical existence. Do Mickey Mouse's thoughts have an independent existence too? Why not? Craig > > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Bruno Marchal <javascript:> > *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> > *Time:* 2013-01-22, 12:28:48 > *Subject:* Re: the curse of materialism > > On 22 Jan 2013, at 18:06, Stephen P. King wrote: > > > On 1/22/2013 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >> On 21 Jan 2013, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote: > >> > >>> On 1/21/2013 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >>>> If you don't take arithmetic as primitive, I can prove that you > >>>> cannot derive both addition and multiplication, nor the existence > >>>> of computer. Then everything around me does not make sense. If > >>>> you believe you can derive them, then do it. But you proceed like > >>>> a literary philosophers, so I have doubt you can derive addition > >>>> and multiplication in the sense I would wait for. > >>> Dear Bruno, > >>> > >>> Is this statement correctly written? How is it coherent that I > >>> need to derive from arithmetic that which is already in arithmetic? > >> > >> Stephen, you are the one telling me that you don't assume the > >> numbers, so it is normal that I ask you how you derive them form > >> what you assume. > > > > Dear Bruno, > > > > I will differ to David Chalmers work to demonstrate a thorough > > demolition of materialism. I see numbers are an aspect of mental > > content and not independently existing entities, so we have an > > irreconcilable difference in our thinking. > > Then comp is meaningless. Even Church thesis is meaningless. Most > papers you referred to becomes meaningless. > > > > > > > > > > >> > >>> It seems to me that the physical activity of counting is the > >>> source of derivation of arithmetics! > >> > >> But you have to derive the physical activity first, then. > >> > > > > I no longer see the utility of trying to prove the existence of > > the content of 1p experience. > > I was talking of deriving physics. We accept content of experience in > comp, but then we can recover it from the numbers complex behavior > when looking at themselves. Then physics is or should be explained > from that, as UDA explains. > > > > > I experience it and can bet that you do as well. That is my theory > > of a physical world and its activity in a nutshell. > > That's the part where we agree. > > I explain experience from computer science, and it seems you disagree > with this, but then I don't understand why you keep defending comp as > it is clear it does not fit with your theory. > > > > > > > > >> > >>> Of cource we cannot just consider the activity of a single entity > >>> but that of many entities, each counting in their own ways and > >>> developing communication methods between themselves. > >>> Materialism fails since it cannot explain how it is possible for > >>> material things to have representations of things, intensionality, > >>> such as numbers. > >> > >> yes, even weak materialism. But your point is not valid, unless you > >> prove it first. > > > > What benefit comes from this "proof"? > > To get an explanation. > > Bruno > > > > > > > >> > >>> Numbers fail, as a ground of ontology, as they can not transform > >>> themselves and remain the same. Matter is exactly that which can > >>> transform and remain the same! > >> > >> ? (looks like a prose to me). > > > > OK... > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected].<javascript:> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+ > [email protected]. <javascript:> > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/34OwtaYwo2EJ. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
