On Wednesday, January 23, 2013 6:03:58 AM UTC-5, rclough wrote:
>
>  Hi Stephen,
>  
> Numbers do have an independent existence, that
> being nonphysical existence.
>

Then so does Mickey Mouse have a nonphysical existence.

Do Mickey Mouse's thoughts have an independent existence too? Why not?

Craig 

>  
>
> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
> *From:* Bruno Marchal <javascript:> 
> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
> *Time:* 2013-01-22, 12:28:48
> *Subject:* Re: the curse of materialism
>
>   On 22 Jan 2013, at 18:06, Stephen P. King wrote:
>
> > On 1/22/2013 10:41 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>
> >> On 21 Jan 2013, at 20:05, Stephen P. King wrote:
> >>
> >>> On 1/21/2013 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >>>> If you don't take arithmetic as primitive, I can prove that you 
> >>>> cannot derive both addition and multiplication, nor the existence 
> >>>> of computer. Then everything around me does not make sense. If 
> >>>> you believe you can derive them, then do it. But you proceed like 
> >>>> a literary philosophers, so I have doubt you can derive addition 
> >>>> and multiplication in the sense I would wait for.
> >>> Dear Bruno,
> >>>
> >>> Is this statement correctly written? How is it coherent that I 
> >>> need to derive from arithmetic that which is already in arithmetic?
> >>
> >> Stephen, you are the one telling me that you don't assume the 
> >> numbers, so it is normal that I ask you how you derive them form 
> >> what you assume.
> >
> > Dear Bruno,
> >
> > I will differ to David Chalmers work to demonstrate a thorough 
> > demolition of materialism. I see numbers are an aspect of mental 
> > content and not independently existing entities, so we have an 
> > irreconcilable difference in our thinking.
>
> Then comp is meaningless. Even Church thesis is meaningless. Most 
> papers you referred to becomes meaningless.
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >
> >>
> >>> It seems to me that the physical activity of counting is the 
> >>> source of derivation of arithmetics!
> >>
> >> But you have to derive the physical activity first, then.
> >>
> >
> > I no longer see the utility of trying to prove the existence of 
> > the content of 1p experience.
>
> I was talking of deriving physics. We accept content of experience in 
> comp, but then we can recover it from the numbers complex behavior 
> when looking at themselves. Then physics is or should be explained 
> from that, as UDA explains.
>
>
>
> > I experience it and can bet that you do as well. That is my theory 
> > of a physical world and its activity in a nutshell.
>
> That's the part where we agree.
>
> I explain experience from computer science, and it seems you disagree 
> with this, but then I don't understand why you keep defending comp as 
> it is clear it does not fit with your theory.
>
>
>
> >
> >
> >>
> >>> Of cource we cannot just consider the activity of a single entity 
> >>> but that of many entities, each counting in their own ways and 
> >>> developing communication methods between themselves.
> >>> Materialism fails since it cannot explain how it is possible for 
> >>> material things to have representations of things, intensionality, 
> >>> such as numbers.
> >>
> >> yes, even weak materialism. But your point is not valid, unless you 
> >> prove it first.
> >
> > What benefit comes from this "proof"?
>
> To get an explanation.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> >
> >
> >>
> >>> Numbers fail, as a ground of ontology, as they can not transform 
> >>> themselves and remain the same. Matter is exactly that which can 
> >>> transform and remain the same!
> >>
> >> ? (looks like a prose to me).
> >
> > OK...
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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