Hi Brunio, I agree with Craig. And I've never understood how there can be any consequence of an emulation, or how it can be proven or not that comp works, since no comparison can be made. Without meaning to be insulting, in short, I say, OK, it's Turing emulable. So what ?
----- Receiving the following content ----- From: Telmo Menezes Receiver: everything-list Time: 2013-02-04, 09:59:09 Subject: Re: context, comp, and multiverses On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote: Hi Bruno Marchal ? I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive context to any?alculation, including comp. Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable. That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis. I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is not geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a Turing emulation of water in another Turing emulated virtual world, but no emulated drop of Turing water can ever be a genuine drop of water within the world that we actually live in. It doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are dying of dehydration. Hi Craig, Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your position on the following statements: - The human brain can be Turing emulated. - There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical human brain and consciousness. ? Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. ? ? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
