On 05 Feb 2013, at 18:03, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
Before you can arrive at a TOE you need to be
able to define what "everything" means.
I distinguish the ontological everything (all the natural numbers),
from the everything "epistemological" or better imo, "theological",
which includes the physical, and which corresponds to the possible
relative numbers beliefs, some of them are stable and defines physical
realities, others are less stable, etc.
Your responses indicate that "everything" to you
means the world of mechanism. No ?
Not really, because comp makes arithmetic, as seen from inside, bigger
than anything we can conceive. That is also why from the numbers pov,
things appear as theological.
All machines are eventually confronted with many non mechanical, yet
existing from their pov, entities. A bit like to study the
distribution of the "digital" prime numbers, you need to consider the
continuum of the complex numbers (cf Riemann). That is a general
phenomenon, that the logicians have proved to be necessary in principle.
Bruno
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-05, 11:18:49
Subject: Re: context, comp, and multiverses
On 05 Feb 2013, at 16:44, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
If comp is assumed, then we need not worry about consequences of
emulation,
it's a given that it works.
Then what is the purpose of this discussion ?
To get a theory of everything. To figure out why and how physical
realities appears, and what is the nature of consciousness, etc.
My main point is that the lasting Aristotelian picture is not
compatible with computationalism, and that it is compatible with
Plato and the most common mystics attempts to figure out what is.
Bruno
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-05, 07:32:01
Subject: Re: context, comp, and multiverses
Hi Roger,
On 04 Feb 2013, at 16:43, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Brunio,
I agree with Craig. And I've never understood how there can be any
consequence of an emulation,
or how it can be proven or not that comp works, since no
comparison can be made.
If comp is true, then we can explain why we cannot prove it.
But we can refute it, because comp explains the details about what
the physical reality can be. So to test comp, just compare the
physics inferred from the emprical reality, and the comp physics.
Without meaning to be insulting, in short, I say, OK, it's Turing
emulable. So what ?
So the TOE is given by addition and multiplication on the integers,
and the global internal views of all creatures is given by Plato
and Plotinus, not by Aristotle and the naturalists. It means that
rational theology is wrong since the closure of Plato academy. In a
nutshell.
Of course you have to study UDA to grasp this.
Bruno
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Telmo Menezes
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2013-02-04, 09:59:09
Subject: Re: context, comp, and multiverses
On Mon, Feb 4, 2013 at 2:31 PM, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]
> wrote:
On Sunday, February 3, 2013 12:11:17 PM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 01 Feb 2013, at 16:42, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Bruno Marchal
I would think that each universe provides its own distinctive
context to any燾alculation, including comp.
Comp is the assumption that we are Turing emulable.
That notion is made very solid by Church's thesis.
I don't think that we can assume that a Turing emulation of us is
actually "us". To the contrary, a Turing emulation of geometry is
not geometry. A Turing emulation of water can be the same as a
Turing emulation of water in another Turing emulated virtual
world, but no emulated drop of Turing water can ever be a genuine
drop of water within the world that we actually live in. It
doesn't matter that 17 is still prime when you are dying of
dehydration.
Hi Craig,
Still trying to understand your theory better. What's your
position on the following statements:
- The human brain can be Turing emulated.
- There is some (possibly mysterious) link between the physical
human brain and consciousness.
Craig
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