On Saturday, February 2, 2013 2:39:53 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
>  On 2/1/2013 12:46 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: 
>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>
> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 4:15 PM, Bruno Marchal <mar...@ulb.ac.be<javascript:>
> > wrote:
>
>>
>>  On 31 Jan 2013, at 15:15, Roger Clough wrote:
>>
>>  Hi Telmo Menezes 
>>  
>> Perhaps you're right, but to my limited knowledge, 
>> a quantum has infinite paths available between
>> points A and B without invoking another universe.
>>  
>>
>>  Once we are able to use (classical) information obtained in the other 
>> quantum paths, like when doing a Fourier transform on  some superposition 
>> of many computations, like in a quantum computer, what makes them different 
>> of other universes?
>>  
>
>  The superposition of many computations itself. Superposition of states 
> on a same universe are a bit hard to swallow. I think people reject the 
> idea of a multiverse because it sounds loony, but my understanding is that 
> making QM consistent with a single universe requires magical thinking. 
>   
>
> I don't think that's true.  There are ways of interpreting QM that are 
> consistent and not "magical".  It's just that they require accepting that 
> somethings happen and some don't.
>
>
>   It's the same as saying that consciousness emerges from neural 
> activity. 
>   
>
> But we don't know of any consciousness that doesn't emerge from neural 
> activity and we don't know of any intelligence that doesn't emerge from the 
> physical processing of information.
>

Where does the consciousness that emerges from neural activity emerge from 
though? Is there any physical system that isn't 'processing information' on 
some scale of millennia or nanoseconds?

If we understand that the nature of consciousness is specifically to 
provide a fisheye lens ontology for a given subject, then it makes perfect 
sense that this distortion would prevent us from seeing subjectivity in the 
periphery of our lens, so to speak, where structures are too large or too 
small, too slow or too fast, too unfamiliar or too distant for us to 
identify with personally, socially, zoologically, or biologically. I 
suggest that this is a quantized scale which maps to our capacity to 
recognize and directly relate to non-human experiences.

For this reason however, functionalism actually fails, contrary to what 
most people will assume. It is because we are assembling machines in total 
ignorance of natural non-human awareness, that our hamfisted attempts have 
lead us only haltingly further on the road to either Frankenstein or HAL. 
By isolating only the tweeter range of human privacy (cognitive awareness), 
without any of the emotional bass or somatic sub-woofer, we can't access 
the full spectrum which is required to begin to access human quality 
personhood. Putting together sentences is not thinking. Matching up queries 
with responses is not understanding.

Craig  


> Brent
>
>   People overlook the magical step because they are more confortable with 
> the resulting model. 
>  
>
>>  
>>  Bruno
>>  
>>  
>>  
>>  So no problem.
>>
>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>> *From:* Telmo Menezes <javascript:> 
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>> *Time:* 2013-01-31, 08:13:30
>> *Subject:* Re: Re: About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space
>>
>>  Hi Roger, 
>>
>>  In the one universe model, where does the extra computational power of 
>> quantum computers come from?
>>  
>>
>> On Thu, Jan 31, 2013 at 2:09 PM, Roger Clough 
>> <rcl...@verizon.net<javascript:>
>> > wrote:
>>
>>>  Hi Telmo Menezes 
>>>  IMHO more than one universe is unjustified.
>>>   
>>>  ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>>>  *From:* Telmo Menezes <javascript:> 
>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>>> *Time:* 2013-01-30, 12:10:08
>>> *Subject:* Re: About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space
>>>
>>>   Hi Roger, 
>>>
>>>  I find it harder to believe in finite universes. Why the precise 
>>> number, whatever it is?
>>>  
>>>
>>>  On Wed, Jan 30, 2013 at 12:46 PM, Roger Clough 
>>> <rcl...@verizon.net<javascript:>
>>> > wrote:
>>>  
>>>>  Hi Stephen P. King 
>>>> It's easier to believe in salvation through faith or UFOs than infinite 
>>>> universes.
>>>>  
>>>>  ----- Receiving the following content ----- 
>>>> *From:* Stephen P. King <javascript:> 
>>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <javascript:> 
>>>> *Time:* 2013-01-28, 09:20:33
>>>> *Subject:* About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space
>>>>  
>>>>  Hi,
>>>>
>>>> 牋 I think this paper might be fodder for a nice discussion! 
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.5295
>>>>
>>>> About the Infinite Repetition of Histories in Space 
>>>> Francisco Jos Soler 
>>>> Gil<http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Gil_F/0/1/0/all/0/1>
>>>> , Manuel 
>>>> Alfonseca<http://arxiv.org/find/physics/1/au:+Alfonseca_M/0/1/0/all/0/1>
>>>>  (Submitted on 22 Jan 2013 (v1 <http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.5295v1>), 
>>>> last revised 23 Jan 2013 (this version, v2))
>>>>
>>>> This paper analyzes two different proposals, one by Ellis and Brundrit, 
>>>> based on classical relativistic cosmology, the other by Garriga and 
>>>> Vilenkin, based on the DH interpretation of quantum mechanics, both of 
>>>> which conclude that, in an infinite universe, planets and living beings 
>>>> must be repeated an infinite number of times. We point to some possible 
>>>> shortcomings in the arguments of these authors. We conclude that the idea 
>>>> of an infinite repetition of histories in space cannot be considered 
>>>> strictly speaking a consequence of current physics and cosmology. Such 
>>>> ideas should be seen rather as examples of {\guillemotleft}ironic 
>>>> science{\guillemotright} in the terminology of John Horgan.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> -- 
>>>> Onward!
>>>>
>>>> Stephen
>>>>
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