On 2/13/2013 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:

    On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg
    <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>> wrote:
    > "1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in
    the case of
    > the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it?  If not,
    why not."
    >
    > Yes
    >
    >
    > "2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the
    torture in the
    > case of the Duplicators?  If yes, please explain, if not,
    please explain."
    >
    > The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we
    only look at
    > the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate
    that, it would
    > not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of
    atoms to be
    > experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be
    shaped like
    > you according to an electron microscope does not make them you.
    >
    > 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing
    in the
    > universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased
    absolutely,
    > because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that
    extend out to
    > eternity.  I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt
    our naive
    > realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to
    consciousness.
    > Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is
    mandated by
    > physics to be universal and uniform.

    What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious
being made up of only a few atoms?

Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms exist in the experience of beings.

Dear Bruno,

I have some questions but they are not well-formed, my apologies. I hope you can make some sense of them. I agree generally that "atoms exist in the experience of beings" only. We (the in the plural sense) happen to be able to agree on the locations and other properties of objects within our individual 1p.

But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable.

If we are 3p-duplicatable then how do we obtain the non-clonability of quantum states?


Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.

I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.

Could it be that the 3p-duplicatability is possible but global 1p correlations of these is not possible, thus obtaining the no cloning of QM?

An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being.

Does this follow from the uniqueness of a fixed point (for a given group of transformations on a closed (or semi-closed) collection?

It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself.

    So would relate them to each other?

Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).

To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way.

It seems to me that you are assuming a special observer that can distinguish all 3p-persons from each other. In my thinking this is cheating.


Bruno



    Sometimes the objection is raised
    that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be
    duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the
    original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the
    quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness
    then
    it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from
    moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body
    changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you.


Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of 'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity of the participant.


    So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if
    you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science,


If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical twin - my guess is probably a dead one.

    and why
    you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from
    day to
day,

Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the other way around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes.

    having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the
    course of months with the matter in the food he eats.


It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it is no longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the participation of drivers who employ vehicles to take them places. Understanding the phenomenon as just a statistical pattern of positions and frequencies, or of objects in a spatial relation are both interesting and useful, but without the underlying sensory-motive grounding, it's ultimately meaningless to the big picture.

Craig



--
Onward!

Stephen

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