On 2/13/2013 2:36 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that
unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.
I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of
a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some
observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what
you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those
points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much
well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and
duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).
To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by
a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view,
is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in
any way.
That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of
experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no
'person'.
Brent
Hi Brent,
Yes, but that is true only for the computable portion of any 1p
view. The "person' itself is not computable, but it related to an
intersection of an infinite number of computations (if I get Bruno's
idea correctly).
--
Onward!
Stephen
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