On 14 Feb 2013, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/14/2013 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote:
On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect
that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.
I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique
experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated
relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the
experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making
astonishing why you are using those points against the
possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated
by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication
(as Stathis argues convincingly).
To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed
by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the
1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel
the split in any way.
That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of
experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is
no 'person'.
Not at all. Both the "Bp & p", and the UDA-personal-diary
definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of
having those experiences, locally.
Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally
by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to
others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons.
There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal
bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their
self-referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations.
Aren't those relations the ones provided by physics - continuity of
bodies, etc. So are you agreeing with my idea that a physical world
in necessary for conscious beings to exist IN.
Yes, indeed. At least in the form of long/deep computations, having
the correct first person sharable indeterminacy measure. That's why
physics is necessary indeed, so much that it has to be extracted from
arithmetic when we assume comp. That's why also we can accept the
postulation of a physical world, or of a God, as an explanation.
You might disagree as "necessary" in natural language can be
ambiguous. In logic, if P is necessary in some context, it means that
it is derivable from the context, but sometimes it can mean that we
have to postulate it (which is the opposite). But with necessary in
the logical sense, it makes sense with computationalism and its
consequences.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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