On 14 Feb 2013, at 19:50, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/14/2013 3:58 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Feb 2013, at 20:36, meekerdb wrote:

On 2/13/2013 7:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.

I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level. An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).

To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way.

That seems to imply that the 1p view is nothing but a stream of experiences and apart from that sequence of experiences there is no 'person'.

Not at all. Both the "Bp & p", and the UDA-personal-diary definitions relates the first person to a machine in a position of having those experiences, locally. Globally, we might become the same person, and differ only locally by our local experiences, but they still indiduate us relatively to others locally, and so there are locally genuine different persons. There is not only sequence of experiences, but plausible universal bodies and context which relates those experiences, through their self-referential logical and arithmetical (computational) relations.

Aren't those relations the ones provided by physics - continuity of bodies, etc. So are you agreeing with my idea that a physical world in necessary for conscious beings to exist IN.

Yes, indeed. At least in the form of long/deep computations, having the correct first person sharable indeterminacy measure. That's why physics is necessary indeed, so much that it has to be extracted from arithmetic when we assume comp. That's why also we can accept the postulation of a physical world, or of a God, as an explanation.

You might disagree as "necessary" in natural language can be ambiguous. In logic, if P is necessary in some context, it means that it is derivable from the context, but sometimes it can mean that we have to postulate it (which is the opposite). But with necessary in the logical sense, it makes sense with computationalism and its consequences.



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