On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg
<whats...@gmail.com> wrote:
> "1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in
the case of
> the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why
not."
>
> Yes
>
>
> "2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the
torture in the
> case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please
explain."
>
> The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only
look at
> the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that,
it would
> not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms
to be
> experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be
shaped like
> you according to an electron microscope does not make them you.
>
> 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in
the
> universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased
absolutely,
> because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that
extend out to
> eternity. I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our
naive
> realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to
consciousness.
> Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is
mandated by
> physics to be universal and uniform.
What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious
being made up of only a few atoms?
Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms,
rather atoms exist in the experience of beings.
But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable.
Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that
unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.
I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from
computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.
An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of
a unique being. It can still be duplicated relatively to some
observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself. Again what
you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those
points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much
well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self-body change and
duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).
To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a
3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is
not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any
way.
Bruno
Sometimes the objection is raised
that an exact quantum state cannot be measured (although it can be
duplicated via quantum teleportation, with destruction of the
original), but this is probably spurious. If duplication down to the
quantum level were needed to maintain continuity of consciousness then
it would be impossible to maintain continuity of consciousness from
moment to moment in ordinary life, since the state of your body
changes in a relatively gross way and you remain you.
Can the year 1965 be duplicated? If you wanted just one millisecond
from 1965. What I am suggesting is that the entire assumption of the
universe as bodies or particles be questioned. The universe is
unique variations of a single experience, with a continuum of
'similarity' in between, contingent upon the experiential capacity
of the participant.
So what you have to explain Craig is what you think would happen if
you tried to duplicate a person using very advanced science,
If you tried to duplicate a person's body, then you get an identical
twin - my guess is probably a dead one.
and why
you don't think that happens when a person lives his life from day to
day,
Because the cells of the body exist within experiences, not the
other way around. We aren't spirits or bodies, we are lifetimes.
having his brain replaced completely (and imprecisely) over the
course of months with the matter in the food he eats.
It's like saying the cars on a freeway are replaced constantly so it
is no longer a freeway. What makes the traffic is the participation
of drivers who employ vehicles to take them places. Understanding
the phenomenon as just a statistical pattern of positions and
frequencies, or of objects in a spatial relation are both
interesting and useful, but without the underlying sensory-motive
grounding, it's ultimately meaningless to the big picture.
Craig
--
Stathis Papaioannou
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