Hi Stephen,

On 13 Feb 2013, at 16:53, Stephen P. King wrote:

On 2/13/2013 10:26 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 13 Feb 2013, at 06:45, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Tuesday, February 12, 2013 10:09:40 PM UTC-5, stathisp wrote:
On Wed, Feb 13, 2013 at 12:24 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> wrote: > "1. Do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the case of > the Restorers, even though you no longer remember it? If not, why not."
>
> Yes
>
>
> "2. If yes, do you consider yourself to have experienced the torture in the > case of the Duplicators? If yes, please explain, if not, please explain."
>
> The idea that atoms can be duplicated is an assumption. If we only look at > the part of a plant that we can see and tried to duplicate that, it would > not have an roots and it would die. I think of the roots of atoms to be > experiences through time. Just having a person who seems to be shaped like
> you according to an electron microscope does not make them you.
>
> 3. Both scenarios I think are based on misconceptions. Nothing in the > universe can be duplicated absolutely and nothing can be erased absolutely, > because what we see of time is, again, missing the roots that extend out to > eternity. I find it bizarre that we find it so easy to doubt our naive > realism when it comes to physics but not when it comes to consciousness. > Somehow we think that the idea that this moment of 'now' is mandated by
> physics to be universal and uniform.

What is to stop duplication of, say, the simplest possible conscious
being made up of only a few atoms?

Because I suspect that conscious beings are not made of atoms, rather atoms exist in the experience of beings.

Dear Bruno,

I have some questions but they are not well-formed, my apologies. I hope you can make some sense of them. I agree generally that "atoms exist in the experience of beings" only. We (the in the plural sense) happen to be able to agree on the locations and other properties of objects within our individual 1p.

OK, as they will be shared in the plural "we".




But that's a consequence of the fact that we might be 3p-duplicable.

If we are 3p-duplicatable then how do we obtain the non- clonability of quantum states?

Because below our substitution level, matter is (re)-defined by all computations going through our state, so the matter which constitute our local material brain cannot be duplicated. It involves the infinite sum on the whole UD*.






Experiences cannot be duplicated literally, because I suspect that unique is the only thing that experiences can literally be.

I agree with this, in the sense that this follows also from computationalism, and thus 3p-duplicability at some level.

Could it be that the 3p-duplicatability is possible but global 1p correlations of these is not possible,

Hmm... we need the 1p correlations to trust the doctor, and introduce them, by chance perhaps, when betting on the correct level, or below.



thus obtaining the no cloning of QM?

An 1p-experience is not duplicable, as it is the unique experience of a unique being.

Does this follow from the uniqueness of a fixed point (for a given group of transformations on a closed (or semi-closed) collection?

You can get it intuitively. Even John Clark agrees that two absolutely identical computations, in case they support a mind, will support a unique mind. That's why in fine a mind is associated with all computations going through the states, and UDA makes matter redefined by the 1p relative measure.




It can still be duplicated relatively to some observer, but not relatively to the experiencer himself.

    So would relate them to each other?

The density of the sharable computations would relate them to each other, with some high normal probability.




Again what you say concur with comp, making astonishing why you are using those points against the possibility of 3p-duplication, which is so much well illustrated by nature, as life is constant self- body change and duplication (as Stathis argues convincingly).

To sum up: with comp, we are 3p-duplicable; the 1p, as attributed by a 3p-person, is relatively duplicable. The 1p, seen from the 1p view, is not duplicable. Like in Everett QM, the 1p can't feel the split in any way.

It seems to me that you are assuming a special observer that can distinguish all 3p-persons from each other. In my thinking this is cheating.

To just enunciate comp we have to agree on the (sigma_1, tiny part of) arithmetic, which gives the whole set of possible 3p relations from which the dreams emerges and cohere (or not).

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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