On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 4:25 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>wrote:
> > > On Friday, March 15, 2013 4:11:32 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: > >> >> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >> >>> >>> >>> On Friday, March 15, 2013 3:04:24 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>> >>>> No, I think that you haven't understood it, >>>> >>> >>> That's because you are only working with a straw man of me. What is it >>> that you think that I don't understand? The legacy view is that if you have >>> many molecular systems working together mechanically, you will naturally >>> get emergent properties that could be mistaken for teleological entities. >>> You can't tell the difference between a brain change that seems meaningful >>> to you and a meaningful experience which causes a brain change. Just >>> because you feel like you are moving your arm doesn't mean that isn't just >>> a narrative fiction that serves a valuable evolutionary purpose. >>> >>> All of that is fine, in some other theoretical universe. In our universe >>> however, it can't work. There is no evolutionary purpose for consciousness >>> or narrative fictions. >>> >> >> The entire field of evolutionary psychology would beg to differ. >> > > Argument from authority. If evolutionary psychologists assume > consciousness has evolutionary benefits it is because they make the same > mistake that you do in looking backward in 20/20 hindsight. Looking from a > pre-conscious era in the past, the idea of consciousness is no more > reasonable than magic appearing spontaneously. Once you take the emergence > of consciousness for granted, sure it's easy to find all kinds of exciting > (and utterly unfalsifiable) uses. > It's not a mistake, it's science. They may be wrong, but they do experiments in support of, or to refute, a given premise. Whether or not the premise is true is beside the point. But you don't even want to entertain the proposition. You just dismiss it, simply because it doesn't agree with your prejudices. > > >> >> >>> The existence of the feeling that you can control your body makes no >>> sense in universe where control is impersonal and involuntary. There is no >>> possibility for teleology to even be conceived in a universe of endless >>> meaningless chain reactions - no basis for proprietary attachment of any >>> kind. It's circular to imagine that it could be important for an >>> epiphenomenal self to believe it is phenomenal. Important how? It's like >>> adding a steering wheel to a mountain. >>> >> >> The fact that you can't conceive of how consciousness could arise from >> mechanism does not amount to an argument against it. >> > > You can't conceive of it either though. That is because it is > inconceivable. Like a square circle. That it is inconceivable tells us > about both squares and circles, as well as logic and sense. > > Sure I can. I can easily conceive of it. I might be wrong, but I can conceive of it. It's funny that you assume that I can't. Projection fallacy? Anyway, even if I couldn't, it *still* would not be an argument against it for the same reason as before. > >> >>> >>> >>>> due to whatever biases have led you to invest so much in your theory - >>>> a theory which is AFAICT completely unfalsifiable and predicts nothing. >>>> >>> >>> No theory which models consciousness will ever be falsifiable, because >>> falsifiability is a quality within consciousness. As far as prediction >>> goes, one of the things it predicts that people who are bound to the >>> extremes of the philosophical spectrum will be intolerant and misrepresent >>> other perspectives. They will cling pathologically to unreal abstractions >>> while flatly denying ordinary experience. >>> >>> >> But you don't have a theory of consciousness, because you assume it. >> > > I don't assume it, it is assumed period. Consciousness is inescapable. How > can you claim to construct any theory independently of it? > A real theory of consciousness explains consciousness in terms of other premises. For instance, any theory of consciousness worth considering should tell you why some things are conscious, and some things aren't... something your theory cannot do because it assumes it from the outset. > You beg the question. And if you are saying physics is wrong - something >> you have asserted many times - >> > > I do not say that physics is wrong, I say that is it incomplete. It is > missing half of the universe, but in the half that it addresses, it > addresses it remarkably well. > Then my point still stands. Describe to us an experiment that shows *how* physics is incomplete. > > >> then it should be possible to construct an experiment that shows that. >> > > We are the experiment. All that is required is for us to think with > honesty and curiosity - to avoid the traps of kneejerk arrogance, fear, > conformity, idolatry for authority, etc. > > Decades of literature in psychology is rife with examples of why introspection is suspect. It has its place, but only in terms of conditional evidence. Nothing we gain from introspection alone could ever be used to refute a theory. > "*Science* is the belief in the ignorance of *experts*." - Feynman > A great quote that admonishes us to never trust our beliefs 100%. Very few people I have met have Feynman's humility. > Craig > > >> >>> >>> >>> >>>> >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 2:02 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Friday, March 15, 2013 1:55:26 PM UTC-4, Terren Suydam wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> >>>>>> On Fri, Mar 15, 2013 at 1:38 PM, Craig Weinberg >>>>>> <whats...@gmail.com>wrote: >>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>>> Exactly. It is interesting also in that it seems to be like one of >>>>>>> those ambiguous images, in that as long as people are focused on one >>>>>>> fixed >>>>>>> idea of reality, they are honestly incapable of seeing any other, even >>>>>>> if >>>>>>> they themselves are sitting on top of it. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> >>>>>> The irony in that statement is staggering. I couldn't satirize you >>>>>> any better if I tried. >>>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Why, do you think that I have never considered the bottom up model of >>>>> causation? >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>>>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.**com. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>>>> >>>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/**group** >>>>> /everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>>>> . >>>>> For more options, visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/**grou**ps/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>>>> . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >>> an email to everything-li...@**googlegroups.com. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.**com. >>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/** >>> group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> >>> . >>> For more options, visit >>> https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> >>> . >>> >>> >>> >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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