On 19 Mar 2013, at 18:37, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

No.

What means "truth value" of something? in which range of phenomena? in all phenomena applicable? how you can test all phenomena applicable to a theory?


That's what the theory is all about, if done honestly.



you can't.

of course we can. We do that since centuries, with some rigor in some filed, and less so in other field, for reason of hotness and personal fears.




The only thing that you can do is to test a particular prediction that the theory predict that may never happen (Popperian falsability)


OK.





Feyerabend demosntrated that not even that is possible, or at least unique, since the perceptions or "facts" must be interpreted according with the theory. there is no fact that is theory-free. A fact pressuposes a theory. So a theory and their perceptions are a closed set, that may be autocoherent.

OK. But note that you need arithmetic or Turing equivalent to make that precise.





So there may be different theories for the same phenomena, each one with their interpreted facts, that may have some kind of morphism between them. That is evidently and pefectly exemplified now in some dualities of string theories, or between newtonian and relativistic mechanics, or in a certain way, between heliocentrism and geocentrisme. where agreeement between phenomena and ptolemaic theory, in the case of heliocentrism, is maintained at the cost of a more complicated theory.

And in computer science, where you can see all first order specification of any Turing universal system as a theory (of everything).





Then, to escape the Feyerabend trap, there is necessary additional criteria, such is the economy of axioms or the Occam Razor as criteria for theory acceptance. Fortunately it works, because it seems that we live in a simple, mathematical universe, which is amazing per se.

Locally, but then comp explains the remative importance of the little numbers, and the less little numbers, ...






About opinions:

But all that one may know, even the facts, are subjective perceptions.

But opinions are about internal subjective perceptions,

That there are no scientific theory about some subjective perceptions (some internal ones) does not say that these subjective perceptions can never be objects of scientific study.

Totally agree.




Simply it means that at this historical moment there is no methods (or there is resistance to them, since the rejection of common sense) that would make them testable and scientific.


Well, with comp there is. See my url for links, but that is what I explain here. The discovery of the universal numbers/machines makes that possible. We can derive physics from computer science + some modal logic of knowledge, and compare with the facts.

Bruno









2013/3/19 Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>


On Friday, March 8, 2013 11:11:38 PM UTC-5, Stephen Paul King wrote:
On 3/8/2013 11:08 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
Hi,

    Is the following a sound claim?


"...scientifically meaningful propositions are questions about the past, the present, the future, or the eternal laws that:
might in principle be both false and true
admit a method, at least in principle, to evaluate their truth values."
--

    Is the following a sound claim?

"...examples of propositions that don't belong to science because one of the disqualifying conditions below holds: they're purely mathematical in character so they require no empirical input at all they're statements about fictional objects such as Hamlet that can't be decided from the only available data, in this case the text of Hamlet (there's no "real Hamlet" offering "additional data")
they depend on subjective opinions and preferences"
--

They sound ok to me. Subjective opinions should not be included when the topic of consideration is subjectivity itself, but they should be understood as expressions of subjective phenomena.

Craig

Onward!

Stephen

PS, I am quoting Sean Carroll

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