Whose definition are you claiming doesn't include that? Why is that arbitrary and unsupported assertion not an 'argument' but my thorough diagram is less than a 'definition'? > You should start with the normal > definition Fuck that, and fuck normal. > then show that it could be neither determined nor random. > It is a serious problem in a debate if someone surreptitiously puts > their conclusion into the definition of the terms. > It is not a problem. All definitions are terms reflecting conclusions. You don't have to agree with my terms, but there is no basis to assert that there is some objective normalcy which they fail to fulfill. My terms are a plausible definition of the actual phenomena we are discussing, and that is the only consideration that I intend to recognize. > > >> >> So, do you believe that it possible that an entity which is > >> >> deterministic from a third person perspective could be conscious, or > >> >> do you believe that an entity which is deterministic from a third > >> >> person perspective could not possibly be conscious? > >> > > >> > > >> > Yes, I think all deterministic looking systems represent > sensory-motor > >> > participation of some kind, but not necessarily on the level that we > >> > assume. > >> > What we see as a cloud may have sensory-motor participation as > droplets > >> > of > >> > water molecules, and as a wisp in the atmosphere as a whole, but not > at > >> > all > >> > as a coherent cloud that we perceive. The cloud is a human scale > emblem, > >> > not > >> > the native entity. The native awareness may reside in a much faster > or > >> > much > >> > slower frequency range or sample rate than our own, so there is > little > >> > hope > >> > of our relating to it personally. It's like Flatland only with > >> > perceptual > >> > relativity rather than quant dimension. > >> > >> I'm not completely sure but I think you've just said the brain could > >> be deterministic and still be conscious. > > > > > > What looks deterministic is not conscious, but what is consciousness can > > have be represented publicly by activity which looks deterministic to > us. > > Nothing is actually, cosmically deterministic, only habitual. > > If something conscious can look deterministic in every empirical test > then that's as good as saying that the brain could be deterministic. No, because empirical tests are third person and consciousness is not. > A > computer is deterministic in every empirical test but you could also > say without fear of contradiction that it is "not actually, cosmically > deterministic, only habitual." > It could be in theory, but in fact, computers prove to be less than sentient in every way. > > >> > This is also why computers are not conscious. The native entity is > >> > microelectronic or geological, not mechanical. The machine as a whole > is > >> > again an emblem, not an organic, self-invested whole. > >> > >> I don't understand what you think the fundamental difference is > >> between a brain, a cloud and a computer. > > > > > > A brain is part of an animal's body, which is the public representation > of > > an animal's lifetime. It is composed of cells which are the public > > representation of microbiological experiences. > > > > A cloud is part of an atmosphere, which is the public representation of > some > > scale of experience - could be geological, galactic, molecular...who > knows. > > > > A computer is an assembly of objects being employed by a foreign agency > for > > its own motives. The objects each have their own history and nature, so > that > > they relate to each other on a very limited and lowest common > denominator > > range of coherence. It is a room full or blind people who don't speak > the > > same language, jostling each other around rhythmically because that's > all > > they can do. > > > > The brain and body are a four billion year old highly integrated > > civilization with thousands of specific common histories. The cloud is > more > > like farmland, passively cycling through organic phases. > > I don't see the relevance of history here. How would it make any > difference to me if the atoms in my body were put there yesterday by a > fantastically improbably whirlwind? Because the atoms are only tokens of a history. It's like if you dropped a bunch of infants into New York City. Even if they had adult bodies, without the history of their experience, they have no way to integrate their perceptions. > I'd still feel basically the same, > though I might have some issues if I learned of my true origin. > That's because you think that the universe is a place filled with objects, but I don't think that is possible. Objects are amputated experiences. Craig > > > -- > Stathis Papaioannou > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. 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