On Wed, Mar 20, 2013 at 12:04 PM, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> All I am saying is that you should start with something that is not
>> already loaded with your conclusion, then reach your conclusion
>> through argument. If I "intend" to do something I do it because I want
>> to do it. On the face of it, I could want to do it and do it whether
>> my brain is determined or random. You can make the case that this is
>> impossible, but you have to actually make the case, not sneak it into
>> the definition.
> I'm not trying to sneak anything into the definition. The case that I make
> is that while it could be locally true that a given person could
> theoretically want something intentionally even if their brain were
> completely driven by unintentional influences, it doesn't make sense that
> there could be any such thing as 'intentional' if the entire universe were
> driven exclusively by unintentional influences. It is like saying that a dog
> could think that it is a cat if cats exist, but if you define the universe
> as having no cats, then there can be no such thing as cat-anything. No
> thoughts about cats, no cat-like feelings, no pictures of cats, etc. In an
> unintentional universe, intention is inconceivable in every way.
You say "it doesn't make sense" that intentional could come from
unintentional but I don't see that at all, not at all. You claim to
have an insight that other people don't have.
>> We are talking about third person observable determinism only.
> Who is?
We are, because this is the normal sense of "determinism" and I
thought this is how you have been using it all along. It's possible
that you don't disagree with me at all if you were not actually
talking about this.
>> brain could be third person observable deterministic and still
> The third person view always seems unintentional (deterministic-random).
> That goes along with it being a public body in space. You can't see
> intentions from third person.
That's right, you can't see consciousness, but you can see if it's
deterministic in the usual sense. So do you in fact agree, after all
this argument, that the brain could be deterministic in the usual
>> So you claim that if the hydrogen atoms in my body were replaced with
>> other hydrogen atoms I would stop being conscious?
> No, I think all hydrogen represents the same experience and capacity for
So their history is irrelevant: all the atoms in my body could be
replaced with atoms specially imported from the Andromeda Galaxy and I
would feel just the same.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.