On Monday, April 8, 2013 8:53:58 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Sun, Apr 7, 2013 at 11:35 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> <whats...@gmail.com<javascript:>> 
> wrote: 
>
> >> It does mean you could replicate World War II if you replicate the 
> >> complex arrangement of matter. It does not mean you would necessarily 
> >> understand it if you replicated it, any more than a photocopier 
> >> understands the image it is copying. But if the photocopier were 
> >> technically very good, the copy could be arbitrarily close to the 
> >> original in the opinion of anyone who *did* understand it. Similarly, 
> >> if you replicated World War II to a close enough tolerance the 
> >> observers inside the replication would understand it and an external 
> >> observer would understand it. 
> > 
> > 
> > Your view assumes that time is a generic plenum of duration, while I 
> > understand that it is precisely the opposite. Time is proprietary and 
> > unrepeatable subjective content. Experiences can be inspected and 
> controlled 
> > publicly to a limited extent but no single event or collection of events 
> can 
> > be repeated in the absolute sense since all events are eventually 
> > intertwined causally with all others. You want to make this about 
> > arrangements of matter but it is about experiences of time. 
>
> Where do you get the idea that subjective events cannot repeat? It 
> seems another thing that you've just made up, with no rational 
> justification. 
>

Subjective events cannot  literally repeat for the same reason that 
historical events cannot literally repeat and you cannot step into the same 
river twice. All conditions are constantly changing so that it is 
impossible for every condition to be reproduced in a given frame of 
experience because what frames private experience is the relation with 
every other experience in the history of the universe, and to an eternity 
ahead.


> >> Matter is, indeed, not absolutely important for mind. What is 
> >> important is the functional arrangement of matter. If this is 
> >> replicated, the mind is replicated. 
> > 
> > 
> > By that assumption, if I arrange styrofoam balls in the shape of the 
> > molecules of a cheeseburger, then a gigantic person would be able to eat 
> it 
> > and it would taste like a cheeseburger. If that were true, then we 
> should 
> > see the same arrangements over and over again - giant ants the size of a 
> > planet, etc. Arrangement is only important because of the properties of 
> what 
> > you are arranging. If you arrange inert blobs, then all that you can 
> ever 
> > get is larger, more complex arrangements of inert blobs. No mind is 
> present 
> > in arrangement. 
>
> Before we move to styrofoam balls, it's problematic that you don't 
> even accept  the modest assumption that the same matter in the same 
> configuration will yield the same behaviour and same subjective 
> states, such as they may be. 
>

There is no "same". There is "seems the same" by some standard of sensory 
interpretation. Configurations of matter don't yield any subjective states, 
any more than configurations of TV sets yield TV programs. The TV sets are 
built so that the programs can be watched. They have no meaning or use 
otherwise.


> >> This happens in the course of 
> >> normal physiology, whereby all the matter in your body is replaced 
> >> with different matter from the food you eat, but you still feel that 
> >> you are you. 
> > 
> > 
> > That's because your lifetime is made of subjective experience, and 
> > experience is publicly accessible in a limited way as forms and 
> functions. 
> > Your view confuses the vehicle of life with a producer of life. 
>
> If your lifetime is made of subjective experiences, the matter in your 
> body seems essential for these experiences to be realised. 


Certainly. If you are going to watch the show, you need a TV set in working 
order.
 

> Disrupting 
> the form of this matter disrupts the experiences, while swapping the 
> matter for different matter in the same form does not. 
>

If you swap the matter in a TV set for cheese, it won't work, even if the 
cheese is in the same configuration. Maybe the TV set is constructed only 
of certain materials for good reasons, or maybe you can make a TV set out 
of cheese, but it receives different (more cheesy?) programs.
 

>
> >> But why would a complex experience require a complex arrangement of 
> >> matter? 
> > 
> > 
> > It doesn't require it, that is just the inevitable embodiment of it. If 
> you 
> > want to play baseball, you play on a baseball diamond. The baseball 
> diamond 
> > doesn't conjure baseball players to the field out of the aether (only in 
> the 
> > dreams of Kevin Costner and functionalists does 'Build it and they will 
> > come." work out.). 
>
> But it does seem, at the very least, that building a person out of 
> matter builds the experiences. 


Says who? Has someone assembled a living person from scratch yet? Have we 
even cloned an adult into another adult without growing it first from a 
zygote?

Use the same matter but disrupt the 
> form - no experiences; use different matter and keep the form - 
> experiences. 
>

What different matter are you talking about? Can you use DNA made out of 
laundry soap?
 

>
> > The experience is primary, and why is to allow complex interactions and 
> > experiences as a kind of trellis to extend aesthetic qualities. If the 
> > experience supervenes on arrangement then you have to explain why there 
> is 
> > any experience there to begin with, what it is, and how it comes to 
> attach 
> > itself to 'arrangements'. You can't do that, but nobody can because it's 
> > incorrect. 
>
> Can you explain what use there is for bodies, why experience is 
> attached to them and disrupting the body disrupts the experience? 
>

A body is a snapshot of a history of privates experience seen from a public 
vantage point. The universe of bodies in space is an infinitely thin cross 
section slice of eternity, as experienced by a particular experiential 
history. By splitting the public and private aesthetic this way, many 
layers can be folded within each other, providing ever richer qualia - 
offloading personal experience into sub-personal and super-personal ranges, 
so that we, for instance, can be human beings as opposed to trillions of 
cellular lifetimes or molecular experiences or a blip in geological time. 
Bodies are inertial frames for scaling perceptual relativity. They allow a 
mega-meta-multiplicity of privacies, each with opportunities for coherent 
public interactions, which also amplify and synergize the aesthetic yield. 
 

>
> >> The influences going back billions of years are just the means to 
> >> create organisms now alive. 
> > 
> > 
> > Why do you think that there is a "now"? What causes it and where does it 
> > come from? Aren't the organisms now alive just the means to create 
> organisms 
> > which will live in the future? 
>
> The organisms now alive purport to create organisms in the future, but 
> they might all be wiped out. The universe doesn't care and has no 
> purpose or function. 
>

Then by that definition, we cannot be part of the universe since we are 
nothing but cares, purposes, and functions.
 

>
> >> It took billions of years of evolution to 
> >> create cars, but if a car randomly fell together from scrap iron and 
> >> so on in the exact form of a Toyota Corolla, it would function exactly 
> >> the same as a Toyota Corolla despite never seeing the inside of a 
> >> Toyota factory. 
> > 
> > 
> > That's because the Toyota doesn't feel like anything. If it did, then it 
> > would not feel like a Toyota since it had never been inside of a Toyota 
> > factory. It would, in the absence of other cars, roads, garages, etc 
> feel 
> > like a collection of scrap iron would feel. 
>
> But the car should function like a normally built car despite its 
> unusual origin, and similarly a human constructed in this way should 
> function like a normal human unless (a) he lacks consciousness and (b) 
> consciousness has a direct effect on matter. I guess you claim (a) and 
> you sort of claim (b) (but back off if pushed), although you have no 
> basis for these beliefs. 
>

I don't back off of (b). You don't understand that my position is that 
matter represents the public interaction of sense. All that matter does is 
a direct effect of sense experience on some level and scale. Sense 
experience cannot literally be repeated because sense is ontologically 
defined as "that which cannot be repeated", i.e. absolute negentropy or 
pure signal. I try not to have any beliefs, I have conjectures and 
hypotheses.


> >> But you have stated repeatedly and forcefully that I am using a straw 
> >> man argument when I say you believe that consciousness is causally 
> >> efficacious and therefore should be observed to be so in experiment! 
> > 
> > 
> > Consciousness is causally efficacious and it is observed to be so in 
> every 
> > experiment already. It is not interpreted that way because nobody yet 
> > suspects that matter itself is literally nothing but the public face of 
> > private nested experiences. We keep looking for a Lapis Medicorum - some 
> > kind of active ingredient which translates the functioning of forms into 
> > sensory experience, but we will never find it because forms and 
> functions 
> > are already nothing but sensory-motor experiences as experienced from a 
> > distance. 
>
> If consciousness is separately causally efficacious then we would see 
> consciousness causing things to happen in neurons not explained by the 
> normal laws of physics. 


Asked and answered: http://multisenserealism.com/the-competition/
 

> That is what it means to be separately 
> causally efficacious!


Who said anything about "separately"? You aren't getting it. I am saying 
that consciousness (sense, really, not talking about human quality 
consciousness here), is the *only thing in the universe that can ever cause 
anything*. Once you have sensory-motor definitions and distinctions, then 
you can have unintentional consequences on some levels for some 
participants while executing the intentional interactions on other levels. 
If I want to move my arm, my brain changes and my arm moves. This is more 
fundamental than all of the laws of physics put together.

 

> If consciousness is merely supervenient then no 
> anomalous physical effects would be observed. The movement of my arm 
> is entirely explicable in terms of biochemical processes, 


Except for the reason why those biochemical processes are initiated in the 
first place.
 

> and wanting 
> to move my arm supervenes on these processes.


No more than your driving the car to the store supervenes on the proper 
function of an engine, transmission, etc. Seen from the other way, the car 
clearly supervenes on your ability to drive and motivation to do so to go 
anywhere. If you can't see that, I don't think that anyone could ever make 
you understand - maybe if you had TMS to revive the dormant right 
hemisphere of your brain.

 

> This is more or less 
> equivalent to you saying "the will to move your arm is the biochemical 
> processes". 


The biochemical process reflects my will in one particular mode of 
description.
 

> On the other hand, if wanting to move my arm causes my arm 
> to move directly then that would result in observation of anomalous 
> physical effects. 
>

There is no 'causes my arm to move', it isn't a mechanical process, it is a 
single instantaneous gesture on the personal level. On the sub-personal 
level, there are chain reactions among tissues and cells, but on that 
level, the person cannot be detected. My view suggests a Multi-sense 
realism. The world of cells exists in a different time gauge than the world 
of persons. What is happening among cells is like what is happening among 
human bodies - social interaction, productivity, etc. What you see through 
a microscope is the view from above, it is missing all of the semantic 
content.
 

>
> >> What you don't understand is that free will is defined differently by 
> >> different people, both philosophers and laypeople. 
> > 
> > 
> > I know that, but that doesn't mean that there is not a clear and 
> singular 
> > understanding which they are missing. 
>
> They're not misunderstanding anything if they choose to define it a 
> certain way and make this definition explicit. Only if they contradict 
> themselves is there a problem. 
>

It is more of a problem if they contradict nature. Who cares if they 
contradict themselves?
 

>
> >> There is not just 
> >> one definition. You choose your own definition, which is OK, but you 
> >> paint yourself into a corner because you are forced to say that free 
> >> will does not exist once you understand that 
> >> neither-determined-nor-random is impossible. 
> > 
> > 
> > I'm not just picking my own fun definition, I am proposing a total 
> > reinterpretation of physics. Within that reinterpretation, how we view 
> free 
> > will is indeed flexible and actually impacts your participation in the 
> > outside world, but that is only possible if we understand that at the 
> root, 
> > the nature of physics allows that very flexibility because free will is 
> the 
> > very fabric of nature. 
>
> Sure, physics allows free will, but only if free will is defined so as 
> to be compatible with physics. 
>

That's the problem. Physics can only exist because it is a consequence of 
free will diffracting into private intention and public extension.
 

>
> >> But if the world is determined by spiritual powers those spiritual 
> >> powers make decisions that are either determined - fixed for all time, 
> >> i.e. fatalism - or random - not fixed, not predictable, fickle. 
> > 
> > 
> > That's up to the spiritual powers. They decide whether to stick to their 
> > word as law or to make laws of their changing whims. It's no different 
> than 
> > a king. Some kings are capricious and cruel, some are enlightened, some 
> are 
> > the former at some times and the latter in others. The king doesn't have 
> to 
> > choose when he is crowned whether his decisions are fixed for all time 
> or 
> > unpredictable - that's kind of the important thing about being the king, 
> you 
> > get to 'have it your way'. 
>
> How would the king know if his decision was determined or not? You 
> seem to have an incredibly naive faith here. "I feel my decisions are 
> not determined, therefore it beyond all doubt that I am right." 
>

If you defer your decisions to sub-personal influences then you simply push 
the problem down a level. How do you know that any level of determinism is 
not intentional? Why is your faith in unintentional phenomena which seem 
intentional any less naive than mine? You not only aren't seeing the forest 
for the trees, you aren't even seeing the tree for the cracks in the bark. 
There is no possibility of any such feeling as "I feel my decisions...X" in 
a universe which is purely unintentional. There are no decisions, just 
events flowing one randomly or reflexively into the next. Where are you 
getting your assumption from that intentional seeming "decisions" could 
exist under determinism?
 

>
> > The king is neither determined nor random, he is intentional or 
> > unintentional. Determined or random are both opposite poles of 
> > unintentional. The more that we argue about this, the more obvious to me 
> it 
> > is that my view is absolutely correct, and that yours is clearly lacking 
> any 
> > realism or deep consideration. Why is it the law that intention must be 
> > unintentional? 
>
> Intentional and unintentional have absolutely nothing to do with 
> determined or random. Whether something is determined or random has to 
> do with causality. 
>

And causality has to do with intentional and unintentional. You can change 
the words all you want, but you cannot possibly account for the feeling of 
intention in a deterministic universe. There is no argument there, only 
misdirection and distraction.


> >> I wonder if you are 
> >> mixing up your cats and dogs when you claim that it is obvious that 
> >> our brains are neither determined nor random. 
> > 
> > 
> > Our brains are going to appear determined or random but if you try to 
> > reproduce a brain based on that, it will not match the behavior of a 
> human 
> > brain over time, because our intention is constantly changing the 
> behavior 
> > of the brain. The appearance of the brain is not the territory of 
> > consciousness, it is the roadmap. 
>
> If there is a direct effect of consciousness on the brain there is no 
> evidence of it.


The brain exists for no purpose but to support and serve consciousness. 
Without consciousness, there can be no brain. What more evidence could you 
want? 
 

> All the evidence we have suggests that the brain 
> follows the rules of physics, and if that is the case, reproducing a 
> brain on this basis will reproduce the brain behaviour. 
>

All evidence we have suggests that we don't exist. Consicousness can only 
be studied because we take our word for it that we are here and we feel 
here and we feel there. It will be physics that has to change to 
accommodate the sophistication of consciousness, not reality that changes 
to accommodate physics. Don't you know that in 50 years everything that we 
think we know now in physics will be quaint anachronisms? Remember a few 
years ago when the entire universe was made of matter and energy, and now 
it's made of dark energy?
 

>
> >> The existence of determinism and randomness does not require 
> >> scientific investigation, like God, the Devil or consciousness 
> >> directly acting on matter. They exist insofar as the universe exists 
> >> and there is at least one change in it, for that change must a priori 
> >> be either determined or random. If you don't agree then you probably 
> >> have a different understanding of these words. 
> > 
> > 
> > If the first change in the universe has nothing before it, then it 
> cannot be 
> > determined, and if it is random then it exists in meaningless isolation. 
> Why 
> > can't you conceive of intention? You are using it every waking moment, 
> all 
> > of your life. You are choosing what words to use, what ideas to express, 
> > based on your personal preference. You are using your brain and fingers 
> and 
> > keyboard to extend your private agenda into the public world. No complex 
> > arrangement of particles cares about that, they are doing mechanical 
> > routines, shadowing your intentions and intensity. It goes the other way 
> too 
> > - you can get tired, and those complex arrangements can pile up 
> instructions 
> > in some queue, and that puts you on the receiving end...still, there is 
> no 
> > tiredness unless there is an aesthetically motivated participant to feel 
> > tired. A machine is not motivated and not aesthetic, so it can know no 
> > tiredness and will work until it breaks itself any time it is set to do 
> so. 
>
> I could ask you similar questions: why is it that you are incapable of 
> conceiving that non-mind organised in the appropriate way gives rise 
> to mind? 


I can conceive of that easily, I just understand that there's no reason 
that would be true. There's no bridge from organization to awareness, just 
as there is no bridge from numbers to colors or flavors.
 

> Why do you deny that you have intention, consciousness and 
> free will when you are obviously just a machine made of atoms? This is 
> not really an argument, it is rhetoric, but it is as good as your 
> rhetoric. 
>

No, it's not any good at all. You are accusing me of denying the very thing 
that you are denying and I am insisting on. You assume atoms when atoms are 
a function of that which detects and defines experiences as atomic.

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.


Reply via email to