On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 6:57 PM, Stephen Paul King <[email protected]> wrote: > Telmo Menezes wrote: > "...My understanding is that > > it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his > book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the > outcomes. > > This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more > reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one > personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own > personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this > particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any > randomness magic." > > What people do not seem to understand is that 1st person perspectives, for > instance, what any one version of Telmo perceives' is constrained to be > consistent with Telmo's existence as a perciever. Observing many points of > view simultaneously from a single location is very much like a list of > propositions that are not mutually consistent. This is a failure of > satisfiability in a Boolean algebra. > The property of satisfiability does not just occur by magic...
Yes, I think about that too. It leads me to the idea that logic is more fundamental than physical laws. I would propose that each subset of consistent perceptions is precisely what a 1p is. That's why I am not aware of my alters, and maybe why I am not aware that I am you. I'm counting memories as perceptions for simplification -- one could imagine the brain as a bag of states that can be perceived, which is perhaps a bizarre way of defining memory / personal diaries. Telmo. > > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > wrote: >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:07 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> > Telmo, >> > >> > I can only give you my opinion. >> >> Thanks Richard. >> >> > You are of course referring to the double >> > slit experiment where one photon can follow at least two different >> > paths, >> > and potentially an infinite number of paths. >> > >> > But even diffraction of a single photon will do that: in the simplest >> > case >> > send a photon on to a semi-infinite metallic plane and the photon >> > potentially scatters into an infinite number of paths from the edge of >> > the >> > plane. We only know which path when the photon reaches a detector plane >> > on >> > the far side. The actual deterministic diffraction pattern only emerges >> > when >> > the number of photons sent approaches infinity in plane waves. The >> > actual >> > path of a single photon is random within the constraints of the >> > infinite-photon diffraction pattern. >> > >> > So I say the way to deal with that is to propagate a large number of >> > photons >> > or do an EM wave calculation for the diffraction pattern. >> >> But then we're still left without a theory that could explain the >> behaviour of a single photon without resorting to randomness, correct? >> >> > I wonder how comp treats such single photon instances. Does it use >> > algorithms that are random number generators? >> >> I'll leave this one for Bruno, of course. My understanding is that >> it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his >> book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the >> outcomes. >> >> This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more >> reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one >> personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own >> personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this >> particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any >> randomness magic. >> >> It's tempting for me to extend this idea to everyone and not just >> Telmos, at the risk of sounding a bit new-agey. >> >> I don't yet understand how an algorithm could be a random number >> generator (non-pseudo), but I think Bruno has more to say here. >> >> Telmo. >> >> > Richard >> > >> > >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 10:35 AM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 4:24 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> >> >> wrote: >> >> > Mathematics itself seems rather magical. >> >> > For instance the sum 1+2+3+4+5.....infinity = -1/12 >> >> > >> >> > And according to Scott Aaronson's new book >> >> > when string theorists estimate the mass of a photon >> >> > they get two components: one being 1/12 >> >> > and the other being that sum, so the mass is zero, >> >> > thanks to Ramanujan >> >> > >> >> > If that sum is cutoff at some very large number but less than >> >> > infinity, >> >> > does anyone know the value of the summation.? >> >> >> >> Hi Richard, >> >> >> >> Ok, but in that case physics is deterministic, just hard to compute. >> >> How do we then deal with the fact that two photons under the precise >> >> same conditions can follow two different paths (except for some hidden >> >> variable we don't know about)? I'm not a physicist and way over my >> >> head here, so this is not a rhetorical question. >> >> >> >> > >> >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 10:15 AM, Telmo Menezes >> >> > <[email protected]> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 3:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou >> >> >> <[email protected]> >> >> >> wrote: >> >> >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, Craig Weinberg >> >> >> > <[email protected]> >> >> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 3:29:51 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >>>> > If matter is deterministic, how could it behave in a random >> >> >> >>>> > way? >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >>> >> >> >> >>> It couldn't. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> Are you saying then that matter is random, or that it is neither >> >> >> >> random >> >> >> >> nor >> >> >> >> deterministic? >> >> >> > >> >> >> > Matter behaves randomly, but probability theory allows us to make >> >> >> > predictions about random events. >> >> >> >> >> >> In my view, randomness = magic. >> >> >> The MWI and Comp are the only theories I've seen so far that do not >> >> >> require magic to explain observed randomness. >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> > -- >> >> >> > Stathis Papaioannou >> >> >> > >> >> >> > -- >> >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> >> > Groups "Everything List" group. >> >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> >> >> > send >> >> >> > an email to [email protected]. >> >> >> > To post to this group, send email to >> >> >> > [email protected]. >> >> >> > Visit this group at >> >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> >> Groups >> >> >> "Everything List" group. >> >> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> >> >> send >> >> >> an >> >> >> email to [email protected]. >> >> >> To post to this group, send email to >> >> >> [email protected]. >> >> >> Visit this group at >> >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> > >> >> > -- >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> > Groups >> >> > "Everything List" group. >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, >> >> > send >> >> > an >> >> > email to [email protected]. >> >> > To post to this group, send email to >> >> > [email protected]. >> >> > Visit this group at >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> > >> >> > >> >> >> >> -- >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> >> Groups >> >> "Everything List" group. >> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> >> an >> >> email to [email protected]. >> >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> >> Visit this group at >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> >> >> >> > >> > -- >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >> > Groups >> > "Everything List" group. >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send >> > an >> > email to [email protected]. >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> > Visit this group at >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> > >> > >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit >> https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en. >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to >> [email protected]. >> >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. >> >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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