On Friday, April 12, 2013 9:57:53 PM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote: > > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 6:57 PM, Stephen Paul King > <kingste...@gmail.com <javascript:>> wrote: > > Telmo Menezes wrote: > > "...My understanding is that > > > > it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his > > book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the > > outcomes. > > > > This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more > > reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one > > personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own > > personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this > > particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any > > randomness magic." > > > > What people do not seem to understand is that 1st person perspectives, > for > > instance, what any one version of Telmo perceives' is constrained to be > > consistent with Telmo's existence as a perciever. Observing many points > of > > view simultaneously from a single location is very much like a list of > > propositions that are not mutually consistent. This is a failure of > > satisfiability in a Boolean algebra. > > The property of satisfiability does not just occur by magic... > > Yes, I think about that too. It leads me to the idea that logic is > more fundamental than physical laws.

I think that physical laws must supervene on sense. It is possible to have experiences which have no logic and follow no physical law, but have aesthetic sense. Logic requires an organization of pattern, that it a particular kind of meta-pattern, but pattern in itself can only be sensed, not designed functionally. > I would propose that each subset > of consistent perceptions is precisely what a 1p is. That's why I am > not aware of my alters, and maybe why I am not aware that I am you. > I'm counting memories as perceptions for simplification -- one could > imagine the brain as a bag of states that can be perceived, which is > perhaps a bizarre way of defining memory / personal diaries. > Any state can be perceived with the proper perceiver, no state can be perceived without one. Craig > > Telmo. > > > > > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Telmo Menezes > > <te...@telmomenezes.com<javascript:>> > > > wrote: > >> > >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:07 PM, Richard Ruquist > >> <yan...@gmail.com<javascript:>> > > >> wrote: > >> > Telmo, > >> > > >> > I can only give you my opinion. > >> > >> Thanks Richard. > >> > >> > You are of course referring to the double > >> > slit experiment where one photon can follow at least two different > >> > paths, > >> > and potentially an infinite number of paths. > >> > > >> > But even diffraction of a single photon will do that: in the simplest > >> > case > >> > send a photon on to a semi-infinite metallic plane and the photon > >> > potentially scatters into an infinite number of paths from the edge > of > >> > the > >> > plane. We only know which path when the photon reaches a detector > plane > >> > on > >> > the far side. The actual deterministic diffraction pattern only > emerges > >> > when > >> > the number of photons sent approaches infinity in plane waves. The > >> > actual > >> > path of a single photon is random within the constraints of the > >> > infinite-photon diffraction pattern. > >> > > >> > So I say the way to deal with that is to propagate a large number of > >> > photons > >> > or do an EM wave calculation for the diffraction pattern. > >> > >> But then we're still left without a theory that could explain the > >> behaviour of a single photon without resorting to randomness, correct? > >> > >> > I wonder how comp treats such single photon instances. Does it use > >> > algorithms that are random number generators? > >> > >> I'll leave this one for Bruno, of course. My understanding is that > >> it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his > >> book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the > >> outcomes. > >> > >> This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more > >> reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one > >> personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own > >> personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this > >> particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any > >> randomness magic. > >> > >> It's tempting for me to extend this idea to everyone and not just > >> Telmos, at the risk of sounding a bit new-agey. > >> > >> I don't yet understand how an algorithm could be a random number > >> generator (non-pseudo), but I think Bruno has more to say here. > >> > >> Telmo. > >> > >> > Richard > >> > > >> > > >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 10:35 AM, Telmo Menezes < > te...@telmomenezes.com <javascript:>> > >> > wrote: > >> >> > >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 4:24 PM, Richard Ruquist > >> >> <yan...@gmail.com<javascript:>> > > >> >> wrote: > >> >> > Mathematics itself seems rather magical. > >> >> > For instance the sum 1+2+3+4+5.....infinity = -1/12 > >> >> > > >> >> > And according to Scott Aaronson's new book > >> >> > when string theorists estimate the mass of a photon > >> >> > they get two components: one being 1/12 > >> >> > and the other being that sum, so the mass is zero, > >> >> > thanks to Ramanujan > >> >> > > >> >> > If that sum is cutoff at some very large number but less than > >> >> > infinity, > >> >> > does anyone know the value of the summation.? > >> >> > >> >> Hi Richard, > >> >> > >> >> Ok, but in that case physics is deterministic, just hard to compute. > >> >> How do we then deal with the fact that two photons under the precise > >> >> same conditions can follow two different paths (except for some > hidden > >> >> variable we don't know about)? I'm not a physicist and way over my > >> >> head here, so this is not a rhetorical question. > >> >> > >> >> > > >> >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 10:15 AM, Telmo Menezes > >> >> > <te...@telmomenezes.com <javascript:>> > >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> > >> >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 3:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > >> >> >> <stat...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > >> >> >> wrote: > >> >> >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, Craig Weinberg > >> >> >> > <whats...@gmail.com <javascript:>> > >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 3:29:51 PM UTC-4, John Clark > wrote: > >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >>>> > If matter is deterministic, how could it behave in a > random > >> >> >> >>>> > way? > >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >>> It couldn't. > >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> Are you saying then that matter is random, or that it is > neither > >> >> >> >> random > >> >> >> >> nor > >> >> >> >> deterministic? > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > Matter behaves randomly, but probability theory allows us to > make > >> >> >> > predictions about random events. > >> >> >> > >> >> >> In my view, randomness = magic. > >> >> >> The MWI and Comp are the only theories I've seen so far that do > not > >> >> >> require magic to explain observed randomness. > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > -- > >> >> >> > Stathis Papaioannou > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > -- > >> >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the > Google > >> >> >> > Groups "Everything List" group. > >> >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from > it, > >> >> >> > send > >> >> >> > an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> >> >> > To post to this group, send email to > >> >> >> > everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> >> >> > Visit this group at > >> >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> >> > For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > >> >> >> -- > >> >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the > Google > >> >> >> Groups > >> >> >> "Everything List" group. > >> >> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > >> >> >> send > >> >> >> an > >> >> >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> >> >> To post to this group, send email to > >> >> >> everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> >> >> Visit this group at > >> >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> > > >> >> > -- > >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> >> > Groups > >> >> > "Everything List" group. > >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > >> >> > send > >> >> > an > >> >> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> >> > To post to this group, send email to > >> >> > everyth...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> >> > Visit this group at > >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> -- > >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> >> Groups > >> >> "Everything List" group. > >> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > send > >> >> an > >> >> email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> >> To post to this group, send email to > >> >> everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>. > > >> >> Visit this group at > >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > -- > >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> > Groups > >> > "Everything List" group. > >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > send > >> > an > >> > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> > To post to this group, send email to > >> > everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>. > > >> > Visit this group at > >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> > > >> > > >> > >> -- > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. > >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > >> > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en. > > > >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > >> > >> To post to this group, send email to > >> everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>. > > >> Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> > >> > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > an > > email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > > To post to this group, send email to > > everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:>. > > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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