I agree Brent, but that assumes that "logic" is limited to distributive
lattice structures. We know better!


On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 12:15 AM, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:

> On 4/12/2013 6:57 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 6:57 PM, Stephen Paul King
>> <[email protected]>  wrote:
>>
>>> >Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>> >"...My understanding is that
>>> >
>>> >it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his
>>> >book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the
>>> >outcomes.
>>> >
>>> >This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more
>>> >reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one
>>> >personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own
>>> >personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this
>>> >particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any
>>> >randomness magic."
>>> >
>>> >What people do not seem to understand is that 1st person perspectives,
>>> for
>>> >instance, what any one version of Telmo perceives' is constrained to be
>>> >consistent with Telmo's existence as a perciever. Observing many points
>>> of
>>> >view simultaneously from a single location is very much like a list of
>>> >propositions that are not mutually consistent. This is a failure of
>>> >satisfiability in a Boolean algebra.
>>> >The property of satisfiability does not just occur by magic...
>>>
>> Yes, I think about that too. It leads me to the idea that logic is
>> more fundamental than physical laws. I would propose that each subset
>> of consistent perceptions is precisely what a 1p is.
>>
>
> But be careful, I think it matters what domain logic is applied to. When
> quantum mechanics was first proposed people said a particle can't be in two
> different states at the same time - that just violates logic.
>
> Brent
>
>
>  That's why I am
>> not aware of my alters, and maybe why I am not aware that I am you.
>> I'm counting memories as perceptions for simplification -- one could
>> imagine the brain as a bag of states that can be perceived, which is
>> perhaps a bizarre way of defining memory / personal diaries.
>>
>> Telmo.
>>
>>
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