I agree Brent, but that assumes that "logic" is limited to distributive lattice structures. We know better!
On Sat, Apr 13, 2013 at 12:15 AM, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 4/12/2013 6:57 PM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 6:57 PM, Stephen Paul King >> <kingstephenp...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> >Telmo Menezes wrote: >>> >"...My understanding is that >>> > >>> >it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his >>> >book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the >>> >outcomes. >>> > >>> >This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more >>> >reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one >>> >personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own >>> >personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this >>> >particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any >>> >randomness magic." >>> > >>> >What people do not seem to understand is that 1st person perspectives, >>> for >>> >instance, what any one version of Telmo perceives' is constrained to be >>> >consistent with Telmo's existence as a perciever. Observing many points >>> of >>> >view simultaneously from a single location is very much like a list of >>> >propositions that are not mutually consistent. This is a failure of >>> >satisfiability in a Boolean algebra. >>> >The property of satisfiability does not just occur by magic... >>> >> Yes, I think about that too. It leads me to the idea that logic is >> more fundamental than physical laws. I would propose that each subset >> of consistent perceptions is precisely what a 1p is. >> > > But be careful, I think it matters what domain logic is applied to. When > quantum mechanics was first proposed people said a particle can't be in two > different states at the same time - that just violates logic. > > Brent > > > That's why I am >> not aware of my alters, and maybe why I am not aware that I am you. >> I'm counting memories as perceptions for simplification -- one could >> imagine the brain as a bag of states that can be perceived, which is >> perhaps a bizarre way of defining memory / personal diaries. >> >> Telmo. >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit https://groups.google.com/d/** > topic/everything-list/K7E-**Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en<https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en> > . > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscribe@**googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > To post to this group, send email to > everything-list@googlegroups.**com<firstname.lastname@example.org> > . > Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/**group/everything-list?hl=en<http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en> > . > For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/**groups/opt_out<https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out> > . > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.