I would not say "more fundamental"... I would say, equally. We can not derive one completely from the other.
On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 9:57 PM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]>wrote: > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 6:57 PM, Stephen Paul King > <[email protected]> wrote: > > Telmo Menezes wrote: > > "...My understanding is that > > > > it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his > > book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the > > outcomes. > > > > This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more > > reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one > > personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own > > personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this > > particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any > > randomness magic." > > > > What people do not seem to understand is that 1st person perspectives, > for > > instance, what any one version of Telmo perceives' is constrained to be > > consistent with Telmo's existence as a perciever. Observing many points > of > > view simultaneously from a single location is very much like a list of > > propositions that are not mutually consistent. This is a failure of > > satisfiability in a Boolean algebra. > > The property of satisfiability does not just occur by magic... > > Yes, I think about that too. It leads me to the idea that logic is > more fundamental than physical laws. I would propose that each subset > of consistent perceptions is precisely what a 1p is. That's why I am > not aware of my alters, and maybe why I am not aware that I am you. > I'm counting memories as perceptions for simplification -- one could > imagine the brain as a bag of states that can be perceived, which is > perhaps a bizarre way of defining memory / personal diaries. > > Telmo. > > > > > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 11:39 AM, Telmo Menezes <[email protected]> > > wrote: > >> > >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:07 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> > >> wrote: > >> > Telmo, > >> > > >> > I can only give you my opinion. > >> > >> Thanks Richard. > >> > >> > You are of course referring to the double > >> > slit experiment where one photon can follow at least two different > >> > paths, > >> > and potentially an infinite number of paths. > >> > > >> > But even diffraction of a single photon will do that: in the simplest > >> > case > >> > send a photon on to a semi-infinite metallic plane and the photon > >> > potentially scatters into an infinite number of paths from the edge of > >> > the > >> > plane. We only know which path when the photon reaches a detector > plane > >> > on > >> > the far side. The actual deterministic diffraction pattern only > emerges > >> > when > >> > the number of photons sent approaches infinity in plane waves. The > >> > actual > >> > path of a single photon is random within the constraints of the > >> > infinite-photon diffraction pattern. > >> > > >> > So I say the way to deal with that is to propagate a large number of > >> > photons > >> > or do an EM wave calculation for the diffraction pattern. > >> > >> But then we're still left without a theory that could explain the > >> behaviour of a single photon without resorting to randomness, correct? > >> > >> > I wonder how comp treats such single photon instances. Does it use > >> > algorithms that are random number generators? > >> > >> I'll leave this one for Bruno, of course. My understanding is that > >> it's consistent with the MWI and also with what Russel proposes in his > >> book: everything happens but each observer only perceives one of the > >> outcomes. > >> > >> This seems highly unintuitive to a lot of people, but it seems more > >> reasonable to me than the idea that there is just one Telmo with one > >> personal diary. If there are infinitely many, each one with his own > >> personal diary, the world still looks exactly like it does to this > >> particular instance of me, and we do not have to resort to any > >> randomness magic. > >> > >> It's tempting for me to extend this idea to everyone and not just > >> Telmos, at the risk of sounding a bit new-agey. > >> > >> I don't yet understand how an algorithm could be a random number > >> generator (non-pseudo), but I think Bruno has more to say here. > >> > >> Telmo. > >> > >> > Richard > >> > > >> > > >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 10:35 AM, Telmo Menezes < > [email protected]> > >> > wrote: > >> >> > >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 4:24 PM, Richard Ruquist <[email protected]> > >> >> wrote: > >> >> > Mathematics itself seems rather magical. > >> >> > For instance the sum 1+2+3+4+5.....infinity = -1/12 > >> >> > > >> >> > And according to Scott Aaronson's new book > >> >> > when string theorists estimate the mass of a photon > >> >> > they get two components: one being 1/12 > >> >> > and the other being that sum, so the mass is zero, > >> >> > thanks to Ramanujan > >> >> > > >> >> > If that sum is cutoff at some very large number but less than > >> >> > infinity, > >> >> > does anyone know the value of the summation.? > >> >> > >> >> Hi Richard, > >> >> > >> >> Ok, but in that case physics is deterministic, just hard to compute. > >> >> How do we then deal with the fact that two photons under the precise > >> >> same conditions can follow two different paths (except for some > hidden > >> >> variable we don't know about)? I'm not a physicist and way over my > >> >> head here, so this is not a rhetorical question. > >> >> > >> >> > > >> >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 10:15 AM, Telmo Menezes > >> >> > <[email protected]> > >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> > >> >> >> On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 3:30 AM, Stathis Papaioannou > >> >> >> <[email protected]> > >> >> >> wrote: > >> >> >> > On Fri, Apr 12, 2013 at 5:35 AM, Craig Weinberg > >> >> >> > <[email protected]> > >> >> >> > wrote: > >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> On Thursday, April 11, 2013 3:29:51 PM UTC-4, John Clark wrote: > >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >>> On Thu, Apr 11, 2013 Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >>>> > If matter is deterministic, how could it behave in a random > >> >> >> >>>> > way? > >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >>> > >> >> >> >>> It couldn't. > >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> > >> >> >> >> Are you saying then that matter is random, or that it is > neither > >> >> >> >> random > >> >> >> >> nor > >> >> >> >> deterministic? > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > Matter behaves randomly, but probability theory allows us to > make > >> >> >> > predictions about random events. > >> >> >> > >> >> >> In my view, randomness = magic. > >> >> >> The MWI and Comp are the only theories I've seen so far that do > not > >> >> >> require magic to explain observed randomness. > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > -- > >> >> >> > Stathis Papaioannou > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > -- > >> >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the > Google > >> >> >> > Groups "Everything List" group. > >> >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from > it, > >> >> >> > send > >> >> >> > an email to [email protected]. > >> >> >> > To post to this group, send email to > >> >> >> > [email protected]. > >> >> >> > Visit this group at > >> >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> >> > For more options, visit > https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > > >> >> >> > >> >> >> -- > >> >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> >> >> Groups > >> >> >> "Everything List" group. > >> >> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > >> >> >> send > >> >> >> an > >> >> >> email to [email protected]. > >> >> >> To post to this group, send email to > >> >> >> [email protected]. > >> >> >> Visit this group at > >> >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> >> >> > >> >> >> > >> >> > > >> >> > -- > >> >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> >> > Groups > >> >> > "Everything List" group. > >> >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > >> >> > send > >> >> > an > >> >> > email to [email protected]. > >> >> > To post to this group, send email to > >> >> > [email protected]. > >> >> > Visit this group at > >> >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> >> > > >> >> > > >> >> > >> >> -- > >> >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> >> Groups > >> >> "Everything List" group. > >> >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > send > >> >> an > >> >> email to [email protected]. > >> >> To post to this group, send email to > [email protected]. > >> >> Visit this group at > >> >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> >> > >> >> > >> > > >> > -- > >> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > >> > Groups > >> > "Everything List" group. > >> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send > >> > an > >> > email to [email protected]. > >> > To post to this group, send email to [email protected] > . > >> > Visit this group at > >> > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> > > >> > > >> > >> -- > >> You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > >> Google Groups "Everything List" group. > >> To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > >> > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en > . > >> To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > >> [email protected]. > >> > >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > >> Visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > >> > >> > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/K7E-Vfwj4QU/unsubscribe?hl=en > . > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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