On 22 Apr 2013, at 20:41, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

Any "aesthetic phenomena" or for that matter anything else we experience is described by the known laws of physics which tells you what matters is the way information is processed.

So, I'm not conviced there really exists a well defined problem here with consciousness. We're told by philosphers that there is a problem and for a long time I believed there was a problem but I've recently come to the conclusion that simply identifying computational states with experiences solves the problem.


This is a confusion between Bp & Bp & p. You are correct, from God's eye view, but no machine can see that, and this will explain the mind- body difficulty, but with a price: physics becomes a branch of machine's bio-psycho-theology. But that's a nice price, as it makes comp testable and thus scientific in the usual sense.

You cannot identify a computational state (a 3p relative notion), and an experience (an 1p absolute notion). But, yes, from the truth point of view, they will be equivalent (with some nuance, as a unique computational state does not makes sense out of a computation, and thus out of universal machine). Also, consciousness will be related to infinities of computations.

Bruno





Saibal

Citeren Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>:



On Friday, April 19, 2013 6:59:28 PM UTC-4, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:

It is whatever an algorithm is computing. All the information is in the
computational state. If you have pain in your knee then exactly what
you are experiencing must be unambiguously present in the computational
state of your brain.


Why would the computational state of your brain be associated with any kind of aesthetic phenomena though? That's Explanatory Gap. The Hard Problem is
really about "why is there any such thing as aesthetic phenomena?"

Craig



Saibal


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