On Tuesday, April 23, 2013 5:16:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 22 Apr 2013, at 20:41, [email protected] <javascript:> wrote: 
>
> > Any "aesthetic phenomena" or for that matter anything else we   
> > experience is described by the known laws of physics which tells you   
> > what matters is the way information is processed. 
> > 
> > So, I'm not conviced there really exists a well defined problem here   
> > with consciousness. We're told by philosphers that there is a   
> > problem and for a long time I believed there was a problem but I've   
> > recently come to the conclusion that simply identifying   
> > computational states with experiences solves the problem. 
>
>
> This is a confusion between Bp & Bp & p. You are correct, from God's   
> eye view, but no machine can see that, and this will explain the mind- 
> body difficulty, but with a price: physics becomes a branch of   
> machine's bio-psycho-theology. But that's a nice price, as it makes   
> comp testable and thus scientific in the usual sense. 
>
> You cannot identify a computational state (a 3p relative notion), and   
> an experience (an 1p absolute notion). But, yes, from the truth point   
> of view, they will be equivalent (with some nuance, as a unique   
> computational state does not makes sense out of a computation, and   
> thus out of universal machine). Also, consciousness will be related to   
> infinities of computations. 
>

Consciousness is that which not only limits infinities, it replaces them. 
Universe rather than multiverse and gestalt wholes rather than ceaseless 
approximation. Vision allows us to see circularity, but a computer cannot 
conceive of circularity, it can only compare discrete values in a way which 
imitates circularity or continuity. The imitation is figurative however, 
not literal. The computer is not actually imitating continuity, any more 
than a flip book cartoon is imitating the natural flow of time awareness. 

It's interesting, Bruno, that you recognize the value of questions over 
answers, theories over physics, but with Bp & Bp & p, you are implicitly 
framing the 3p view as the Bp & p. I would think that you should agree with 
my view that the 3p view is a Bp within the total of all 1p. Belief is a 
type of awareness, as is physical interaction, but awareness itself can 
neither be a logical nor a physical agenda. No belief or physical substance 
can 'exist' without being held together by aesthetic sense of some kind.


Craig
 

>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
>
> > 
> > Saibal 
> > 
> > Citeren Craig Weinberg <[email protected] <javascript:>>: 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On Friday, April 19, 2013 6:59:28 PM UTC-4, [email protected] wrote: 
> >>> 
> >>> It is whatever an algorithm is computing. All the information is   
> >>> in the 
> >>> computational state. If you have pain in your knee then exactly what 
> >>> you are experiencing must be unambiguously present in the   
> >>> computational 
> >>> state of your brain. 
> >>> 
> >> 
> >> Why would the computational state of your brain be associated with   
> >> any kind 
> >> of aesthetic phenomena though? That's Explanatory Gap. The Hard   
> >> Problem is 
> >> really about "why is there any such thing as aesthetic phenomena?" 
> >> 
> >> Craig 
> >> 
> >> 
> >>> 
> >>> Saibal 
> >>> 
> >> 
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
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