Brent's observation, that Vilenkin and Gaurriga's indicate that their eternal inflation (Guth and Linde too?) being limited, says that the MWI versions of our universe something like 10^90, or was it 10^150 in Vilenkin's Many World's ( book 2006, Vilenkin used both exponentials). That is a massive amount of "limited", can we not agree? Some versions can be awfully close to ours with this amount.
Mitch -----Original Message----- From: smitra <[email protected]> To: everything-list <[email protected]> Sent: Fri, May 24, 2013 8:32 am Subject: Re: That the mind works even after the brain ceases to function suggests its ... Citeren meekerdb <[email protected]>: > On 5/23/2013 4:31 PM, [email protected] wrote: >> Citeren meekerdb <[email protected]>: >> >>> On 5/23/2013 7:07 AM, [email protected] wrote: >>>> Citeren Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: >>>> >>>>> >>>>> On 23 May 2013, at 00:05, meekerdb wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> On 5/22/2013 2:49 PM, [email protected] wrote: >>>>>>> Thought experiment: Suppose that someone has never experienced >>>>>>> touching hot objects before. As long as this person does not >>>>>>> find out that touching hot objects is painful, either by >>>>>>> touching hot objects himself or by being told that it is >>>>>>> painful, he will be in a superposition of two sectors of the >>>>>>> multiverse where he has and has not the ability to feel >>>>>>> extreme pain when touching very hot objects. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The sector where he does not have the ability to feel pain has >>>>>>> a very small amplitude, there evolution has run a different >>>>>>> course. In the other sector evoluton has run the course where >>>>>>> the ancestors in the first sector ddidn't survive, it where >>>>>>> the creatures with some mutation that lead to them feeling pain >>>>>>> when touching hot objects that survived here. >>>>>>> >>>>>>> The mere act of touching a hot object is a measuremnt which >>>>>>> locates the person in the latter sector, only then does the >>>>>>> outcome of the events that happened a long time ago become >>>>>>> determined. >>>>>> >>>>>> That assumes that the "same person" exists up to the moment of >>>>>> measurement, differing, via FPI, only in the ability to feel >>>>>> pain. I doubt that is possible. There is a common assumption >>>>>> that QM makes anything possible, but it actually imposes some >>>>>> restrictions, although it's hard to say how they extend to the >>>>>> biology of macroscopic beings. >>>>> >>>>> I agree. Even in comp there are "terrible" restrictions on what >>>>> comp states exist and how they are first person and third person >>>>> related. Indeed that's why we can extract physics (and a whole >>>>> theology) from numbers and + and *. >>>>> >>>>> Bruno >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>>> It can be shown quite rigorously that everything that is not >>>> strictly forbidden by conservation laws, must happen in generic >>>> multiverse scenarios. >>> >>> Do you have a citation for that? And how do you know what >>> conservation laws there are? >> >> See e.g. here: >> >> http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0102010 >> >> for the proof for eternal inflation models. > > That doesn't prove what you claimed. Garriga and Vilenkin argue that > there are only finitely many distinct histories, say N. But in that > case no possible history with probability less than 1/N can occur. > Although N is very large, only very small fraction of histories > permitted by conservation laws can occur. > No, all the possible histories can occur, it's just that in a finite volume you only have a finite number of states. Saibal > Brent > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, > send an email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
