Citeren meekerdb <>:

On 5/23/2013 5:20 PM, wrote:
Citeren meekerdb <>:

On 5/23/2013 12:51 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/5/23 meekerdb < <>>

    On 5/23/2013 11:27 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

2013/5/23 meekerdb < <>>

On 5/23/2013 7:07 AM, <> wrote:

Citeren Bruno Marchal < <>>:

                On 23 May 2013, at 00:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/22/2013 2:49 PM, <> wrote:

Thought experiment: Suppose that someone has never experienced touching hot objects before. As long as this person does not find out that touching hot objects is painful, either by touching hot objects himself or by being told that it is painful, he will be in a superposition of two sectors of the multiverse where he has and has not the ability to feel
                        extreme pain when touching very hot objects.

The sector where he does not have the ability to feel pain has a very small amplitude, there evolution has run a different course. In the other sector evoluton has run the course where the ancestors in the first sector ddidn't survive, it where the creatures with some mutation that lead to them feeling pain when touching hot objects that survived here.

The mere act of touching a hot object is a measuremnt which locates the person in the latter sector, only then does the outcome of the events that happened a long time ago become

That assumes that the "same person" exists up to the moment of measurement, differing, via FPI, only in the ability to feel pain. I doubt that is possible. There is a common assumption that QM makes anything possible, but it actually imposes some restrictions, although it's hard to say how they extend to the
                    biology of  macroscopic beings.

I agree. Even in comp there are "terrible" restrictions on what comp states exist and how they are first person and third person related. Indeed that's why we can extract physics (and a whole theology) from
                 numbers and + and *.

                Bruno <>

It can be shown quite rigorously that everything that is not strictly forbidden by conservation laws, must happen in generic multiverse scenarios.

Do you have a citation for that? And how do you know what conservation laws
        there are?

But then, the whole point I'm making is that the information in your brain that makes you feel something comes not out of thin air, but precisely due to evolution. So, you feeling pain comes about via ordinary down to earth quantum mechanics, which links this straightforwardly to the deaths of those creatures that by dying and not becoming your ancestors, gave rise to
            your ability to feel pain.

Of course I agree that the "gave rise to". But that's not the same supposing they were in a superposition with you up until the moment you felt a pain. That seems to reserve to consciousness the ability to "collapse the wave

Well if all "universes" still exists after the measurement, it just gives the ability for consciousness to localize itself... not collapsing anything which seems right. To collapse the wave function would mean that after self localisation, only one universe would remain. It does not seems that was what Saibal was implying.


You're right, I put that badly. There are lots of things that "localize" themselves by making a classical record, and even an irretrievable one (c.f. buckyball double slit). So it seems wrong to suppose that consciousness is in a superposition when
    there is information in the environment

But until you know it consciously, your mind state is the same in two parts of the multiverse,

Why should mind=consciousness? Over any short duration I am conscious of *very* few things. "I" am hardly localized at all. Which is just another form of the "white rabbit" problem. On this world view, why should expect any continuity in my experience sufficient to define "I"?

Your consciousness is only located at specific moments in time as computational states.

That doesn't follow from QM.  You're mixing in assumptions about comp.

I'm not assuming COMP here, it's simply that at any moment of time the physical state of the system is well defined.

The idea that you need a time interval to properly define this is wrong and unphysical.

What's physical about assuming you are a sequence of states in computations? If a state is discrete why should the sequence respect physical conservation laws.

A sequence of states contains too much information, it is the state at some moment and then another moment etc. etc. it's hard to see how this can yield anything useful w.r.t.

the one where you ancestors did feel pain and the one where they didn't... how can you differentiate those two states ? How can the two outcomes not be correct continuations of that mind state before measurement ?

The question is whether the "measurement" has to be an event in my consciousness or can it be a event(s) in the physical world. Suppose I am drugged so that I can't feel pain for the moment, but I remember having felt pain. Then I will expect to be able to feel pain again and I will infer that evolution provided my ancestors with ability to feel pain and others that didn't died childless. The physical world theory seems to provide the better model.

If you remember having physical pain in the past, that means that you have information about that in your mind. The state of your mind and that of the real world are thus correlated on that point. If at some point in time you are not aware of something at all, then you are in a superposition of different sectors of the real world where the information you are not aware can be different.

Yes, I understand the implications. But as I said it just raises the white rabbit problem. If you take it seriously then there is no "you" and there is no possibility of having better or worse expectation. It's a useless theory that just says "Everything is experienced, so "you" will experience it."

The white rabbit problem isn't a real problem, it is based on flawed assumptions. There is a well defined "you" at every moment in time defined as a computational state by its physical state without having to resort to previous states, because in quantum mechanics the physical state will be a complicated entangled state with the environment which contains at any moment the correlations that define exactly what computation has been carried out.

The flawed assumption is that just because we're dealing with classical computation and typical quantum effects are not apparent in the sense that the outcome of any experiment is well described by classical physics, we can pretend that the system is classical and then apply classical reasoning to thought experiments like the in movie graph argument etc. etc.



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