On 5/23/2013 4:31 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>:

On 5/23/2013 7:07 AM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Citeren Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>:

On 23 May 2013, at 00:05, meekerdb wrote:

On 5/22/2013 2:49 PM, smi...@zonnet.nl wrote:
Thought experiment: Suppose that someone has never experienced touching hot objects before. As long as this person does not find out that touching hot objects is painful, either by touching hot objects himself or by being told that it is painful, he will be in a superposition of two sectors of the multiverse where he has and has not the ability to feel extreme pain when touching very hot objects.

The sector where he does not have the ability to feel pain has a very small amplitude, there evolution has run a different course. In the other sector evoluton has run the course where the ancestors in the first sector ddidn't survive, it where the creatures with some mutation that lead to them feeling pain when touching hot objects that survived here.

The mere act of touching a hot object is a measuremnt which locates the person in the latter sector, only then does the outcome of the events that happened a long time ago become determined.

That assumes that the "same person" exists up to the moment of measurement, differing, via FPI, only in the ability to feel pain. I doubt that is possible. There is a common assumption that QM makes anything possible, but it actually imposes some restrictions, although it's hard to say how they extend to the biology of macroscopic beings.

I agree. Even in comp there are "terrible" restrictions on what comp states exist and how they are first person and third person related. Indeed that's why we can extract physics (and a whole theology) from numbers and + and *.



It can be shown quite rigorously that everything that is not strictly forbidden by conservation laws, must happen in generic multiverse scenarios.

Do you have a citation for that?  And how do you know what conservation laws 
there are?

See e.g. here:


for the proof for eternal inflation models.

That doesn't prove what you claimed. Garriga and Vilenkin argue that there are only finitely many distinct histories, say N. But in that case no possible history with probability less than 1/N can occur. Although N is very large, only very small fraction of histories permitted by conservation laws can occur.


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