On 19 Jun 2013, at 11:00, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

This is a question in relation to the question of wether mathematical objects exist or not. I think that this is not a fundamental question and a loss of time. Mathematics are.

Existence is not much. Better to get rid of this concept. As you said, to say that the pysical world, or the mind or mathematics exist or not is more a question of positioning each concept deeper in the chain of causalities or explanations. Of course the three exist in the sense that they are. But it may be that the fundamental things are not the concepts but the relations between concepts. And maybe different chains of causalities or explanations are compatible with the reality.

There is no absolute way to argue in favour of one or the other existential beliefs except in terms of predictive or explanatory power.In the long term the ones who have the best explanations outnumber these that don´t. Truth and existence and what is good converge in the long term. That is why, in an implicit recognition of that long term effect, the cornerstone of the acceptance of something is the explanatory power, that has two aspects: what happens an will happen for one side, and in the other side, what would never happen and if it happens then the theory is not worth the pain.

To argue about the existence of naked mathematics and the bare mind or "matter" as such is mostly aesthetical, because they don´t have predictive power. unless we add special metaphisical attributes to them such are inmutable laws, Evolution, or a creator mind and a Revelation. Then these theories adquire predictive and explanatory power.

What is frustrating is that most of the discussions are not about explanations or predictions, but about aesthetical matters such are the less possible number of axioms to explain everithing, the possible and the impossible, with no falsability criteria.

For me an explanation for everything is not an explanation, because it can not be argued agains. It is true that if everything goes and everything may potentially exist, then a selection criteria can filter out what is impossible. An omniexplicative theory must include then this selection criteria to be a true theory of everything. this selection criteria is the part that can be tested.


I agree with you on all point. Not sure you really got mine, if that was a critic.

QM works at first sight, but it needs comp to justify the self- selection.

But then comp makes bigger the domain of indeterminacy, and it can work only if physics (the wave and the collapse if QM is correct) emerge from the FPI, or consciousness selection, on all computations.

And we can argue again, and indeed refute it by comparing the physics of the average universal machine with our empirical physics.

Old QM:
Wave
collapse
Unintelligible theories of mind.

Everett QM
Wave
Comp theory of mind.

Machine's QM:
Comp theory of mind.

And my point is only that such theory is testable.

Bruno










2013/6/14 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

On 13 Jun 2013, at 21:48, Alberto G. Corona wrote:

What "exist" means?

What do you mean?

Such a question will depend on the TOE used.
What can exist, by definition or by assumption, will be the elements in the basic ontology of the TOE. (Either articles, fields, numbers, consciousness, perhaps, ... )

With comp, a reasonable TOE assumes only that 0 exists, s(0) exists, s(s(0)) exists, etc.

Such objects obeys two laws, that we assume: the laws of addition and multiplication, and some succession axioms (like 0 ≠ s(x), to avoid finite fields).

This entails the existence of an" indra net of numbers dreams", like the UD*, or the (structured) set of true sigma_1 sentences, from which we have to explain the emergence of physical reality/ realities, consciousness, etc.

Bruno





2013/6/13 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>

On 12 Jun 2013, at 22:38, meekerdb wrote:

On 6/12/2013 1:34 PM, spudboy...@aol.com wrote:
Physicalism is by itself a strong assumption, incompatible with a simple and elegant theory of mind (computer science/arithmetic).

You say that from time to time, but when pressed it seems to just be that assuming fundamental matter is, assuming comp, otiose - not incompatible.

They are epistemologically incompatible, or if you prefer, incompatible with the use of Occam razor, which I assume in the search of the TOE. (I have explained this already, so to be short, I just "say incompatible").

If it were incompatible, then derivative matter would be incompatible too.

Of course.

Bruno


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