# Re: Unexpected Hanging

```That is related with the rusell paradox, since Th juzge does not say whaw
type of surprise will be. He is telling: you will receive a surprise.. but
not the type of the surprise:```
```
a surprise about being hange plainly , or
a meta-surprise for being hangled because what I said or
a meta-meta-surprise for being hanged because what i said and you though

That is similar to the problem of the sets of all sets etc.

Rusell solved his paradox using type theory:  The objects have to have a
type . The type of set is one, the set of all sets is other etc.   That is
why to avoid contradictions one has to specify the types.

2013/9/13 Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>

> The surprise can appear in a single day: "You will be hanged on monday
> and you will be surprised by it". Then he reason that he will not be
> surprised. But he is hanged and surprised by it.
>
> Thar reduces the problem to the example of the Diamonds from
> Brent. So the reasoning is:
>
> 1)  The statement of the judge is self contradictory, so it is false: He
> can not tell me the hanging day and be surprised.
>
> but the judge tells the truth  and the surprise in this case is a
> metasurprise; it is not surprised for being hanged; I´m surprised by
> its reasoning.
>
> But the reasoning is about the problem, not the metaproblem of either
> if the judge is lying or not. the
> word "surprised" in 1) is about being hanged, not about the truth
> value of the judge words.
>
> The metaproblem reasoning is:
>
> 2) taking the problem I reason that the Judge is lying. but if that
> occurs, I will be surprised for this reason. So I will be hanged.
>
>
> Yet there is a level-three problem, because if I reason the
> metaproblem as 2), I will not be surprised If get hanged on
> monday...... and so on
>
> 2013/9/13, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>:
> > On 9/12/2013 2:33 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
> >> Time for some philosophy then :)
> >>
> >> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep:
> >>
> >>
> >> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this
> >> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's
> >> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is
> >> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that
> >> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct?
> >
> > The wiki article gives most resolutions of the antinomy.  The logical
> > seen most clearly in case of the man who says to his wife, "Here's your
> > anniversary
> > present.  You'll be completely surprised by what it is when you open it.
> > It's diamond
> > earrings."  So, does the wife reason that she'll be surprised, yet he's
> said
> > it's diamond
> > earrings; so it can't be diamond earrings because then she wouldn't be
> > surprised.  Then
> > she opens the box and it's diamond earrings AND she's surprised.
> >
> > It just shows that if you reason from contradictory statements you can
> > arrive at any
> > conclusion.
> >
> > Brent
> >
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>
>
> --
> Alberto.
>
>
>
> --
> Alberto.
>

--
Alberto.

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