That is related with the rusell paradox, since Th juzge does not say whaw type of surprise will be. He is telling: you will receive a surprise.. but not the type of the surprise:
a surprise about being hange plainly , or a meta-surprise for being hangled because what I said or a meta-meta-surprise for being hanged because what i said and you though about etc etc. That is similar to the problem of the sets of all sets etc. Rusell solved his paradox using type theory: The objects have to have a type . The type of set is one, the set of all sets is other etc. That is why to avoid contradictions one has to specify the types. 2013/9/13 Alberto G. Corona <[email protected]> > The surprise can appear in a single day: "You will be hanged on monday > and you will be surprised by it". Then he reason that he will not be > surprised. But he is hanged and surprised by it. > > Thar reduces the problem to the example of the Diamonds from > Brent. So the reasoning is: > > 1) The statement of the judge is self contradictory, so it is false: He > can not tell me the hanging day and be surprised. > > but the judge tells the truth and the surprise in this case is a > metasurprise; it is not surprised for being hanged; I´m surprised by > its reasoning. > > But the reasoning is about the problem, not the metaproblem of either > if the judge is lying or not. the > word "surprised" in 1) is about being hanged, not about the truth > value of the judge words. > > The metaproblem reasoning is: > > 2) taking the problem I reason that the Judge is lying. but if that > occurs, I will be surprised for this reason. So I will be hanged. > > > Yet there is a level-three problem, because if I reason the > metaproblem as 2), I will not be surprised If get hanged on > monday...... and so on > > 2013/9/13, meekerdb <[email protected]>: > > On 9/12/2013 2:33 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> Time for some philosophy then :) > >> > >> Here's a paradox that's making me lose sleep: > >> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unexpected_hanging_paradox > >> > >> Probably many of you already know about it. > >> > >> What mostly bothers me is the epistemological crisis that this > >> introduces. I cannot find a problem with the reasoning, but it's > >> clearly false. So I know that I don't know why this reasoning is > >> false. Now, how can I know if there are other types of reasoning that > >> I don't even know that I don't know that they are correct? > > > > The wiki article gives most resolutions of the antinomy. The logical > > contradiction is > > seen most clearly in case of the man who says to his wife, "Here's your > > anniversary > > present. You'll be completely surprised by what it is when you open it. > > It's diamond > > earrings." So, does the wife reason that she'll be surprised, yet he's > said > > it's diamond > > earrings; so it can't be diamond earrings because then she wouldn't be > > surprised. Then > > she opens the box and it's diamond earrings AND she's surprised. > > > > It just shows that if you reason from contradictory statements you can > > arrive at any > > conclusion. > > > > Brent > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > > "Everything List" group. > > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > > email to [email protected]. > > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > > > -- > Alberto. > > > > -- > Alberto. > -- Alberto. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
