On 17 Sep 2013, at 19:46, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Tuesday, September 17, 2013 6:07:23 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes wrote:
On Mon, Sep 16, 2013 at 7:47 PM, Craig Weinberg <whats...@gmail.com>
> On Saturday, September 14, 2013 5:53:01 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
>> On Fri, Sep 13, 2013 at 12:06 PM, Craig Weinberg
>> > On Friday, September 13, 2013 5:31:40 AM UTC-4, telmo_menezes
>> >> On Thu, Sep 12, 2013 at 5:47 PM, Craig Weinberg
>> >> wrote:
>> >> > Which reasoning is clearly false?
>> >> >
>> >> > Here's what I'm thinking:
>> >> >
>> >> > 1) The conclusion "I won't be surprised to be hanged Friday
if I am
>> >> > not
>> >> > hanged by Thursday" creates another proposition to be
>> >> > about.
>> >> > By
>> >> > leaving the condition of 'surprise' open ended, it could
>> >> > being
>> >> > surprised that the judge lied, or any number of other soft
>> >> > contingencies
>> >> > that could render an 'unexpected' outcome.
>> >> Ok but that's not the setup. The judge did not lie and there
>> >> soft contingencies. The surprise is purely from not having
>> >> the day of the execution was the one when somebody knocked at
>> >> at noon. Even if you allow for some soft contingencies, I
>> >> paradox still holds.
>> > I don't understand why it's a paradox and not just
contradiction. If I
>> > say
>> > 'you're going to die this week and it's going to be a surprise
>> > that
>> > is already a contradiction.
>> Ok, after a good amount of thought, I have come to agree with this.
>> The judge lied. You convinced me! :)
> Ah cool! Thanks for posting the problem also, it helped me
> lost mathematical-logical ability.
>> (with due credit to Alberto and
>> Brent, who also helped convince me). A more honest statement
>> "you're going to die this week and it will probably be a surprise
>> when", or, "you'll probably die this week and it will be a
>> you do".
>> My thought process involves reducing the thing to a game. There
>> turns in the game, and the attacker has to choose one of those
>> to press a button. The defender also has a button, and its goal
>> predict the action of the attacker. If both press the button. the
>> defender wins. If only the attacker pressers the button, the
>> wins. Otherwise the game continues. The system is automated so that
>> the attacker button is automatically pressed. Now the attacker
>> is making the claim that he can always win this game. He cannot,
>> is no conceivable algorithm that guarantees this. Playing multiple
>> instances of the game, I would guess the optimal strategy for the
>> attacker is to chose a random turn, including the last. This will
>> offer 20% of the games to the defender, but there's nothing
>> can do.
>> I read your post and now I think I understand you positions better.
>> am not convinced, but I will grant you that they are not easily
>> attackable. On the other hand, this could be because they are
>> equivalent to Carl Sagan's "invisible dragon in the garage" or, as
>> Popper would put it, unfalsifiable. Do you care about
> Falsifiability is nice - especially in public-facing physics, but
> falsification itself is a sensory experience, we should not insist
> same kind of falsifiability for private physics that we have in
Alright. Personal or 1p experiences are probably outside the realm of
phenomena that can be investigated under Popperian science. I think
this is something that many of us can agree with, independently of
accepting/rejecting comp, for example. I think this is also what
characterises hard-core positivists: they either find 1p reality
irrelevant or even reject its existence.
Which makes sense, since from that kind of fundamentalist 3p
perspective, we can only take consciousness for granted. From there,
we can either admit or deny that we are taking it for granted, and
if we admit it, then we would want to minimize the significance of
>> If so, can you conceive of some experiment to test what you're
> There may not be a test, so much as accumulating a body of
> correlating uses of information and qualities of sensation. It's
more at the
> hypothesis stage than the testing stage.
>> The symbol grounding problem haunted me before I had a name for it.
>> It's a very intuitive problem indeed. I tend to believe that the
>> answer will actually look something like an Escher painting.
>> that neuroscience is enough, one can imagine the coevolution of
>> firing patterns with environmental conditions. This can lead to
>> firing patterns that correlate with higher abstractions -- the
>> symbols. Why not?
> Still there's the hard problem. Why would neural firing patterns
I don't know! But I think the mystery is not so much how symbols
appear or why they appear. Computers can do that.
Computers don't use symbols.
They use physics,
You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts.
and the common physics of discrete objects has an arithmetic
universality which can be exploited. Computers don't care about
symbols though, or output formats.
Nor do brains, in that sense. Only person care on those things, but
brain and computer (body) are not person, but person's local vehicle.
The big mystery is
how they become qualia.
That would be a mystery, but it is one that cannot have an answer.
In my understanding quanta only makes sense as a derived sampling or
'accounting' of qualia. Objects are aesthetically impoverished
OK, but then what can we do with "computer use physics". That becomes
circular, it seems to me.
Which leads me to a point where I can
definitely agree with you (if I understand you correctly): private
experiences have at least the same reality status as public
experiences. My main problem with your ideas is that I feel you throw
too much of the baby away with the (public) bath water.
I don't think there are any experiences which are public and not
private. There are experiences, and there are private experiences in
which other private experiences are re-presented as public form-
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