On 23 Sep 2013, at 20:26, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/23/2013 11:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
I'm just now reading a reading a very long paper (more of a short
book, actually) by Scott Aaronson, on the subject of free will,
is one of those rare works in that topic that is not
gibberish. Suffice it to say, that if he is ultimately convincing,
would get me to stop at step 0 (ie COMP is false), but more on that
later when I finish it.
I read a book by Aaronson sometimes ago, but, like many, he did not
go out of the frame of Aristotle notion of reality in that book. I
will take a look to the paper. ...
After a glimpse overview, If he is correct, and if comp is correct,
it would only mean that his "freebits" would emerge from the
numbers law; but I am not sure if I need to believe in such a use
of "free" for free-will. The compatibilist approach is enough.
Randomness adds nothing as this has been often debated. To be quick
Aaronson seems satisfied that a person cannot be duplicated because
of the no-cloning theorem. So he assumes that avoids first person
indeterminacy. I don't think he properly considered that a 'person'
is not that sharply defined and many duplications would be 'good
I agree. And the UDA reasoning needs only that we can be prepared in
some state; even unknown.
Also, it means that he assumes QM, and assumes we are defined by our
quantum state. Comp does not assume this, and with comp, the apparent
matter cannot be cloned for the reason that it is eventually precisely
determined only by the first person indeterminacy on all relative
As I said, Aaronson does not escape the Aristotelian frame. I have not
yet read the details, but I do not think that his very type of
reasoning can refute comp.
It migh tmake the level very low, but this will only add randomness in
the first person indeterminacy, as that alone adds nothing to free-
will. I would say that it would even endanger it, like if a coin could
decide for me!
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