On 25 September 2013 16:03, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > On 9/24/2013 8:44 PM, LizR wrote: > > On 25 September 2013 15:41, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote: > >> On 9/24/2013 6:32 PM, LizR wrote: >> >> On 25 September 2013 13:38, Russell Standish <li...@hpcoders.com.au>wrote: >> >>> This is also true of materialism. Whether you think this is a problem >>> or not depends on whether you think the "hard problem" is a problem or >>> not. >>> >> >> Indeed. I was about to say something similar (to the effect that it's >> hard to imagine how "mere atoms" can have sights, sounds, smells etc >> either). >> >> >> As a rule, if you want to explain X you need to start from something >> without X. >> >> Absolutely. > > If you know of such an explanation, or even the outlines of one, I'd be > interested to hear it. As Russell said, this is the so-called "hard > problem" so any light (or sound, touch etc) on it would be welcome. > > > My 'solution' to the hard problem is to prognosticate that when we have > built intelligent robots we will have learned the significance of having an > internal narrative memory. We will have learned what emotions and feelings > are at the level of sensors and computation and action. And when we have > done that 'the hard problem' will be seen to have been an idle question - > like "What is life." proved to be in the 20th century. > > Yes, that certainly seems like a possible solution (or maybe "dissolution") to the problem, although I wouldn't say that "what is life?" proved to be an idle question. Some of the proposed *solutions* turned out to be "idle" (such as ones involving an "elan vital", which of course didn't answer the question at all). Life is intimately bound up with at least two major fields (evolution and computation) and we've learned a lot about a lot of things by studying it (and we aren't finished yet, I would say).
So that answers Russell's question, at least from your point of view as (I assume) a "primary materialist", and (interestingly, IMHO) equally answers the criticism (if it was intended as such) that Craig leveled against comp. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.