On 9/24/2013 9:45 PM, LizR wrote:
On 25 September 2013 16:39, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

    Right. "Idle" isn't exactly the right word.  I think that like "life" 
    will be seen to be different things and there will be distinguished 
different kinds
    of consciousness and we'll design robots to have more or less and this kind 
    that.  And we'll design drugs and brain implants to change and augment 
human brains
    based on our understanding of these different things that we now tend to 
lump under

Yes. that's my feeling. Arthur C Clarke and uniting into the "Overmind" as a sort of worth-wide-web of human brains, for one example. But more likely, and less mystically, time-sharing on each other's brains and swapping sense feeds and so on, so ego boundaries become blurred and what it means to be "me" dissolves ... I'm hoping I get to see / experience some of this!

So that answers Russell's question, at least from your point of view as (I assume) a "primary materialist", and (interestingly, IMHO) equally answers the criticism (if it was intended as such) that Craig leveled against comp.

    As I understand Bruno's theory it also 'dissolves' the hard problem by 
reducing it
    to a property of certain logics, namely a computational system is (or can 
    conscious if it is Lobian, i.e. if it can prove Godel's incompleteness about
    itself.  This seems too narrowly technical to me (does it actually have to 
have done
    the proof, or just be potentially able to do it?), but I can see that it 
would be a
    facet of intelligence that would contribute a certain aspect of 

I assume that it merely has to be capable of doing it (a bit like Penrose's rather derided ideas in "The Emperor's new Mind"). Otherwise we have the unlikely scenario that only mathematicians and logicians are conscious!

    Of course Bruno proposes that the logic (as in arithmetic for example) 
exists in
platonia and that the physical world is just an aspect of relations in arithmetic. I'm not sure about that, but I suspect that if fully worked out the derivative
    physical world will prove necessary for the logic to produce consciousness 
- so
    physics is maybe not so derivative.

Comp explicitly denies the need for a physical world (if I understand it correctly) so if that did turn out to be necessary, I think it would disprove comp?

Bruno gives that impression sometimes, but when pressed he explains that he only means that the physical world not fundamental, it is derivative or emergent, not that it is unnecessary. I like to think of it like this,


which was originally suggested by Bruno, but he later said he wasn't serious. If you think of it in terms of explanations or modeling, instead of causality, then I think the circle can be virtuous IF it's big enough to take everything in.


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