On 25 September 2013 16:39, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

> Right. "Idle" isn't exactly the right word.  I think that like "life"
> consciousness will be seen to be different things and there will be
> distinguished different kinds of consciousness and we'll design robots to
> have more or less and this kind or that.  And we'll design drugs and brain
> implants to change and augment human brains based on our understanding of
> these different things that we now tend to lump under "consciousness".

Yes. that's my feeling. Arthur C Clarke and uniting into the "Overmind" as
a sort of worth-wide-web of human brains, for one example. But more likely,
and less mystically, time-sharing on each other's brains and swapping sense
feeds and so on, so ego boundaries become blurred and what it means to be
"me" dissolves ... I'm hoping I get to see / experience some of this!

 So that answers Russell's question, at least from your point of view as (I
assume) a "primary materialist", and (interestingly, IMHO) equally answers
the criticism (if it was intended as such) that Craig leveled against comp.

As I understand Bruno's theory it also 'dissolves' the hard problem by
> reducing it to a property of certain logics, namely a computational system
> is (or can be) conscious if it is Lobian, i.e. if it can prove Godel's
> incompleteness about itself.  This seems too narrowly technical to me (does
> it actually have to have done the proof, or just be potentially able to do
> it?), but I can see that it would be a facet of intelligence that would
> contribute a certain aspect of consciousness.

I assume that it merely has to be capable of doing it (a bit like Penrose's
rather derided ideas in "The Emperor's new Mind"). Otherwise we have the
unlikely scenario that only mathematicians and logicians are conscious!

> Of course Bruno proposes that the logic (as in arithmetic for example)
> exists in platonia and that the physical world is just an aspect of
> relations in arithmetic.  I'm not sure about that, but I suspect that if
> fully worked out the derivative physical world will prove necessary for the
> logic to produce consciousness - so physics is maybe not so derivative.

Comp explicitly denies the need for a physical world (if I understand it
correctly) so if that did turn out to be necessary, I think it would
disprove comp?

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