On 25 Sep 2013, at 07:43, meekerdb wrote:
On 9/24/2013 9:45 PM, LizR wrote:
On 25 September 2013 16:39, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
Right. "Idle" isn't exactly the right word. I think that like
"life" consciousness will be seen to be different things
and there will be distinguished different kinds of
consciousness and we'll design robots to have more or less and this
kind or that. And we'll design drugs and brain implants to change
and augment human brains based on our understanding of these
different things that we now tend to lump under "consciousness".
Yes. that's my feeling. Arthur C Clarke and uniting into the
"Overmind" as a sort of worth-wide-web of human brains, for one
example. But more likely, and less mystically, time-sharing on each
other's brains and swapping sense feeds and so on, so ego
boundaries become blurred and what it means to be "me"
dissolves ... I'm hoping I get to see / experience some of this!
So that answers Russell's question, at least from your point of
view as (I assume) a "primary materialist", and (interestingly,
IMHO) equally answers the criticism (if it was intended as such)
that Craig leveled against comp.
As I understand Bruno's theory it also 'dissolves' the hard problem
by reducing it to a property of certain logics, namely a
computational system is (or can be) conscious if it is Lobian, i.e.
if it can prove Godel's incompleteness about itself.
Not just that. See below.
This seems too narrowly technical to me (does it actually have to
have done the proof, or just be potentially able to do it?), but I
can see that it would be a facet of intelligence that would
contribute a certain aspect of consciousness.
I assume that it merely has to be capable of doing it (a bit like
Penrose's rather derided ideas in "The Emperor's new Mind").
Otherwise we have the unlikely scenario that only mathematicians
and logicians are conscious!
Of course Bruno proposes that the logic (as in arithmetic for
example) exists in platonia and that the physical world is just an
aspect of relations in arithmetic. I'm not sure about that, but I
suspect that if fully worked out the derivative physical world will
prove necessary for the logic to produce consciousness - so physics
is maybe not so derivative.
Comp explicitly denies the need for a physical world (if I
understand it correctly) so if that did turn out to be necessary, I
think it would disprove comp?
Bruno gives that impression sometimes, but when pressed he explains
that he only means that the physical world not fundamental, it is
derivative or emergent, not that it is unnecessary. I like to think
of it like this,
NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> PHYSICS ->
NUMBERS
which was originally suggested by Bruno, but he later said he wasn't
serious.
? I am serious on this :)
May be I meant that the more proper way to put it is:
NUMBERS -> "MACHINE DREAMS" -> PHYSICAL -> HUMANS -> human PHYSICS ->
human NUMBERS
If you think of it in terms of explanations or modeling, instead of
causality, then I think the circle can be virtuous IF it's big
enough to take everything in.
OK.
A key point consists in using the intensional nuances of the
provability predicate. Matter does not come from incompleteness per
se, but from its consequences translated in the different machine's
points of view. It fits well also with Plotinus' Platonic correction
of Aristotle negative definition of matter (where "god" loses control,
what God cannot determined, like W/M in the duplication thought
experiences).
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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