On Friday, October 4, 2013 10:39:44 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
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> On 02 Oct 2013, at 19:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: 
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> > 
> > 
> > On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:26:45 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: 
> > 
> > On 02 Oct 2013, at 06:56, Pierz wrote: 
> > 
> >> 
> >> 
> >> On Wednesday, October 2, 2013 12:46:17 AM UTC+10, Bruno Marchal   
> >> wrote: 
> > Then the reasoning shows (at a meta-level, made possible with the   
> > assumption used) how consciousness and beliefs (more or less   
> > deluded) in physical realities develop in arithmetic. 
> > 
> > Are 'beliefs in' physical realities the same as experiencing the   
> > realism of public physics though? For instance, I believe that if I   
> > should avoid driving recklessly in the same way as I would in a   
> > driving game as I would in my actual car. Because my belief that the   
> > consequences of a real life collision are more severe than a game   
> > collision, I would drive more conservatively in real life. That's   
> > all ok, but a belief about consequences would not generate realistic   
> > qualia. If someone held a gun to my head while I play the racing   
> > game, the game would not become any more realistic. I always feel   
> > like there is an equivalence between belief and qualia which is   
> > being implied here that is not the case. It's along the lines of   
> > assuming that a hypnotic state can fully replace reality. If that   
> > were the case, of course, everybody would be lining up to get   
> > hypnotized.There is some permeability there, but I think it's   
> > simplistic to imply that the aggregate of all qualia arises purely   
> > from the arbitrary tokenization of beliefs. 
>
>
> Unless the tokenization is made explicit, and then your nuance should   
> be catured by the nuance between (Bp & Dt, inteeligible matter) and   
> (Bp & Dt & p, sensible matter). 
>

Can't you just add an "& p" flag to your token? It need not be sensible or 
intelligible, just consistent.
 

>
>
>
> > 
> > 
> > But that's the mathematical (arithmetical) part. In UDA it is just   
> > shown that if comp is true (an hypothesis on consciousness) then   
> > physics is a branch of arithmetic. More precisely a branch of the   
> > ideally self-referentially correct machine's theology. (always in   
> > the Greek sense). 
> > 
> > There is no pretense that comp is true, but if it is true, the   
> > correct "QM" cannot postulate the wave, it has to derive the wave   
> > from the numbers. That's what UDA shows: a problem. AUDA (the   
> > machine's interview) provides the only path (by Gödel, Löb, Solovay)   
> > capable of relating the truth and all machine's points of view. 
> > 
> > There will be many ways to extract physics from the numbers, but   
> > interviewing the self-introspecting universal machine is the only   
> > way to get not just the laws of physics, but also why it can hurt,   
> > and why a part of that seems to be necessarily not functional. 
> > 
> > I don't think that an interview with anyone can explain why they can   
> > hurt, unless you have already naturalized an expectation of pain. In   
> > other words, if we don't presume that universal machine experiences   
> > anything, there is no need to invent qualia or experience to justify   
> > any mathematical relation. If mathematically all that you need is   
> > non-functional, secret kinds of variable labels to represent machine   
> > states, I don't see why we should assume they are qualitative. If   
> > anything, the unity of arithmetic truth would demand a single   
> > sensory channel that constitutes all possible I/O. 
>
> But then you get zombies, which make no sense with comp.


Because comp is blind to authenticity, which works perfectly: Zombie-hood 
make no sense to zombies.

 

> But you are   
> right, I have to attribute consciousness to all universal machines, at   
> the start. That consciousness will be a computer science theoretical   
> semantical fixed point, that is something that the machine can "know",   
> but cannot prove ("know" in a larger sense than the Theaetetus'   
> notion, it is more an unconscious bet than a belief or proof). (Cf   
> also Helmholtz, and the idea that perception is a form of   
> extrapolation). 
>

It seems to me that treating consciousness as a zero dimensional point 
intersecting two logical sets (known data and unprovable data) is accurate 
from the point of view of Comp, but that's only because Comp is by 
definition blind to qualia. If you are blind, you can define sight as a 
capacity that you know you are lacking, but you can't prove it (since you 
can't literally see what you are missing). 

The Comp perspective can't account for feeling for what it actually is (a 
direct aesthetic appreciation), it can only describe what kinds of things 
happen as a consequence of unprovable knowledge.

Pansensitivity (P) proposes that sensation is a universal property. 


Primordial Pansensitivity (PP) proposes that because sensation is 
primitive, mechanism is derived from insensitivity. Whether it is mechanism 
that assumes form without sensibility (materialism) or function without 
sensation (Comp), they both can only view feeling as a black 
box/epiphenomenon/illusion. 

Under PP, both Materialism and Comp make sense as partial negative images 
of P, so that PP is the only continuum or capacity needed to explain 
feeling and doing (sense-motive), objective forms and functions 
(mass-energy), and informative positions and dispositions (space-time).

PP says that the appearance of forms and functions are, from an absolute 
perspective, sensory-motive experiences which have been alienated through 
time and across space.


Primordial Identity Pansensitivity (PIP) adds to the Ouroboran Monism of 
PP, (sense twisted within itself = private experience vs public bodies) by 
suggesting that PP is not only irreducible, but it is irreducibility 
itself. 

PIP suggests that distance is a kind of insensitivity, is so that all other 
primitive possibilities which are grounded in mechanism, such as 
information or energy, are reductionist in a way which oversignifies the 
distanced perspective, while anthropomorphic primitives such as love or 
divinity are holistic in a way which oversignifies the local perspective. 
Local and distant are assumed to be Cartesian opposites, but PIP maps 
locality and distance as the same in terms of being two opposite branches 
of insensitivity. Both the holistic and reductionist views ignore the 
production of distance which they both rely on for their perspective, both 
take perspective itself, perception, and relativity for granted.


Craig


Bruno 
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> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
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