On 3 October 2013 14:40, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God
>> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has
>> different qualia. This is a proof of comp, provided that brain physics
>> is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable.
>> Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement
>> brain contain a hypercomputer.
> It's like saying that if the same rent is paid for every apartment in the
> same building, then the same person must be living there, and that proves
> that rent payments are people.
The hypothesis is that if we replicate the rent then we necessarily
replicate the people. But we can think of an experiment where the rent
is replicated but the person is not replicated - there is no
contradiction here. However, if we can replicate the I/O behaviour of
the neurons but not the associated qualia there is a contradiction,
since that would allow partial zombies, which you have agreed are
absurd. Therefore, it is impossible to replicate the I/O behaviour of
the neurons without replicating the qualia. To refute this, you either
have to show that 1) replicating the I/O behaviour of the neurons
without replicating the qualia does not lead to partial zombies, or 2)
that partial zombies are not absurd.
A partial zombie is a person whose qualia change, for example he
becomes blind, but his behaviour does not change and he does not
notice that his qualia change.
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