On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: >> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God >> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has >> different qualia. This is a proof of comp, > > > Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a prothesis, only > because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and not of > the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest the person > if it emulates the correct level.
But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates the behaviour but not the qualia? The problem is that it would allow one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. > If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the consciousness > of a sleeping dreaming person, ... > OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not even sure > that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only because "I" from the > first person point of view is distributed in infinities of computations, and > I cannot exclude that the qualia (certainly stable lasting qualia) might > rely on that. > > > > > >> provided that brain physics >> is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable. >> Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement >> brain contain a hypercomputer. > > > OK. > > Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.