On 5 October 2013 00:40, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: >> The argument is simply summarised thus: it is impossible even for God >> to make a brain prosthesis that reproduces the I/O behaviour but has >> different qualia. This is a proof of comp, > > > Hmm... I can agree, but eventually no God can make such a prothesis, only > because the qualia is an attribute of the "immaterial person", and not of > the brain, body, or computer. Then the prosthesis will manifest the person > if it emulates the correct level.
But if the qualia are attributed to the substance of the physical brain then where is the problem making a prosthesis that replicates the behaviour but not the qualia? The problem is that it would allow one to make a partial zombie, which I think is absurd. Therefore, the qualia cannot be attributed to the substance of the physical brain. > If not, even me, can do a brain prothesis that reproduce the consciousness > of a sleeping dreaming person, ... > OK, I guess you mean the full I/O behavior, but for this, I am not even sure > that my actual current brain can be enough, ... if only because "I" from the > first person point of view is distributed in infinities of computations, and > I cannot exclude that the qualia (certainly stable lasting qualia) might > rely on that. > > > > > >> provided that brain physics >> is computable, or functionalism if brain physics is not computable. >> Non-comp functionalism may entail, for example, that the replacement >> brain contain a hypercomputer. > > > OK. > > Bruno -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
