On Thursday, October 24, 2013 10:16:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> On 23 Oct 2013, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> <snip>
> "My problem is that you need   
> to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark."
> Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math 
> instead?
> With comp, when you test the flavor of coffee, you do, actually,  test the 
> flavor of some math. 

That's what I am saying. It would have to be the case under comp. My point 
though is that it is absurd. Tasting something gives us no mathematical 
understanding. The understanding that flavor does provide is the opposite 
of math. It is immediate (although develops briefly through time as well), 
it is irreducible to anything other than flavor, and it does not consist of 
'stepped reckoning' of any kind, it is an aesthetic gestalt.

> But you test it from the inside of math, and so it looks different from 
> the math we learn at school. That it looks different is explainable by any 
> Löbian machine,

Taste doesn't look like anything though, and it cannot ever look like 
anything. If it did, then it would be vision. If it could be vision, then 
it would be profoundly redundant to have both senses of the same 
data...(assuming that Santa Claus has brought the possibility of senses to 
begin with.)

and can be understood intuitively with some training in the comp thought 
> experiment. The difference are accounted by the intensional nuance of 
> Gödel's provability. 

I don't think it is. It seems clear to me that any mechanical accounting of 
sense implicitly takes sense for granted from the start. There is no 
functional difference between sight, smell, feeling, hearing, etc. There is 
no intensional nuance that ties to the possibility of any one of them - 
only a grey box where something like virtual proof could theoretically live.



> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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