On Friday, October 25, 2013 10:11:04 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 24 Oct 2013, at 18:53, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Thursday, October 24, 2013 10:16:55 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 23 Oct 2013, at 20:07, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> >> >> On Wednesday, October 23, 2013 12:34:05 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> <snip> >> >> "My problem is that you need >> to do the math to evaluate how much seriously you can take this remark." >> >> Under comp, why couldn't I just imagine tasting the flavor of the math >> instead? >> >> >> With comp, when you test the flavor of coffee, you do, actually, test >> the flavor of some math. >> > > That's what I am saying. It would have to be the case under comp. My point > though is that it is absurd. Tasting something gives us no mathematical > understanding. > > > It does. It might teach you what math looks like from inside. >

If that were true, then the same math could not be expressed as both a sound or an image, but we know that it can. For math to have an interior that looked like something, there would have to be some mathematical expression which only has an interior which is visible rather than auditory, olfactory, etc. We already know from synesthesia and from playing with peripherals for electronic computers that this is not true. It would be like building a hard drive that cannot accept bytes that came from a camera, only a microphone. > Or you beg the question. keep in mind I don't argue for comp, but you are > arguing against comp, so it is up to you to give some argument that testing > a flavor cannot be a mathematical phenomenon. > The argument is that mathematical information is neither necessary nor sufficient to generate an experience of flavor, color, etc. so there is no expectation that math has anything to do with it. Comp has no more credence in explaining flavor than would geography. The understanding that flavor does provide is the opposite of math. It is immediate Thanks to many cells doing a work learned through a very long time, may be. It seems immediate, but the evidences (brains) is that it is not. The evidence of the brain does not show that flavor exists, or worse, that flavor could possibly exist. If the work that the cells do creates flavor, then the flavor would exist for them and not for us. We cannot make the attachment of physics a condition for qualia but not for comp. You assume disembodied, unexperienced math, but I do not. You assume qualia contingent on math, but I assume the opposite. (although develops briefly through time as well), it is irreducible to anything other than flavor, and it does not consist of 'stepped reckoning' of any kind, it is an aesthetic gestalt. > OK. No problem with this in the comp theory. That's the point of the limitation theorems. Some truth can be accessible by machine, without them having to do any hard work. But there is no reason to suspect that truth can include sensations. > But you test it from the inside of math, and so it looks different from > the math we learn at school. That it looks different is explainable by any > Löbian machine, > Taste doesn't look like anything though, and it cannot ever look like anything. If it did, then it would be vision. If it could be vision, then it would be profoundly redundant to have both senses of the same data...(assuming that Santa Claus has brought the possibility of senses to begin with.) and can be understood intuitively with some training in the comp thought > experiment. The difference are accounted by the intensional nuance of > Gödel's provability. > I don't think it is. It seems clear to me that any mechanical accounting of sense implicitly takes sense for granted from the start. There is no functional difference between sight, smell, feeling, hearing, etc. There is no intensional nuance that ties to the possibility of any one of them - only a grey box where something like virtual proof could theoretically live. I can relate to your feelings, but I don't see why a machine could not too. > You just assert it, but you don't really provide an argument. > > You do point on a difficulty, but a difficulty is not an impossibility, > especially that computer science already explains why machines will find > that difficult too, for their own accessible truth spectrum. > The argument against comp is not one of impossibility, but of empirical failure. Sure, numbers could do this or that, but our experience does not support that it has ever happened. In the mean time, the view that I suggest I think does make more sense and supports our experience fully. Craig Bruno Craig Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> . Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.