On 12/5/2013 12:43 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 03 Dec 2013, at 19:29, John Clark wrote:
On Mon, Dec 2, 2013 at 2:00 PM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]
<mailto:[email protected]>> wrot
> I have already insist that God cannot be part of the explanation. We
agree on this.
Then I repeat my question, why add useless wheels within wheels that explain nothing to
otherwise nice theories?
To take into account the discovery already made by arithmetical machine that there is a
transcendental truth responsible for their beliefs, which is beyond their beliefs.
For the arithmetical machine that would be Peano's axioms and the rules of inference. I
don't see that they are either transcendental or true?
The space of such true but non rationally communicable truth is axiomatized, at the
propositional level, by G* minus G, and this permits a transparent interpretation of
Plotinus theology in arithmetic, and this illustrates already the fact that
computationalism leads to a Platonist theology, and contradicts the common Aristotelian
metaphysics/theology implicit among many scientists.
But these transcendental, i.e. unprovable, truths are rather trivial: "This sentence
cannot be proven." They are not TRANSCENDENTAL the way theologians mean - beyond the
natural world and edifying of human experience.
Brent
The experience of "God", in the large sense I have given is part of the data in the
puzzle. You might read my paper "La machine Mystic", or the second part of the sane04
paper for more on this, if you are interested. This shows also that arithmetic explains
not only the apparent existence of matter (constructively, and thus making comp
testable), but it gives some light on altered consciousness and other brain perturbation
experience, and "mystical" type of knowledge/beliefs/comprehension, making some other
aspect of comp testable in some first person sense.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ <http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/>
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