On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 8:03 PM, Edgar L. Owen <[email protected]> wrote:
> Jason, > > You state "The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably > contains the program that is identical to your mind." > My apologies, I meant the "UD" which short for "Universal Dovetailer", not the UDA, which is the "Universal Dovetailer Argument". > > You can't be serious! > I am. > As stated that's the most ridiculous statement I've heard here today in > all manner of respects! > What, may I ask, is so ridiculous about the statement? The UD is a program that executes all programs. If your mind is a program, then it is executed by the UD. Jason > > > On Friday, December 27, 2013 7:56:44 PM UTC-5, Jason wrote: >> >> >> >> >> On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:33 PM, Stephen Paul King < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Dear Jason, >>> >>> Interleaving below. >>> >>> >>> On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:20 PM, Jason Resch <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:03 PM, LizR <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> On 28 December 2013 11:55, Stephen Paul King <[email protected] >>>>> > wrote: >>>>> >>>>>> Hi LizR, >>>>>> >>>>>> That is what is not explicitly explained! I could see how one >>>>>> might make an argument based on Godel numbers and a choice of a numbering >>>>>> scheme could show the existence of a string of numbers that, if run on >>>>>> some >>>>>> computer, would generate a description of the interaction of several >>>>>> actors. But this ignores the problems of concurrency and "point of view". >>>>>> The best one might be able to do, AFAIK, is cook up a description of the >>>>>> interactions of many "observers" -each one is an intersection of >>>>>> infinitely >>>>>> many computations, but such a description would itself be the content of >>>>>> some observer's point of view that assumes a choice of Godel numbering >>>>>> scheme. >>>>>> Something doesn't seem right about this! >>>>>> >>>>>> It seems to suggest "multi-solipsism" or something along those lines >>>>> - which doesn't make it wrong, of course. >>>>> >>>>> I await Bruno's answer with interest. I think he has already said >>>>> something about this, but I don't recall it being satisfactory, at least >>>>> to >>>>> my limited understanding. >>>>> >>>> >>>> I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say. My perspective is >>>> that most of the computations that support you and I are not isolated and >>>> short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but much larger, long-running >>>> computations such as those that correspond to a universe in which life >>>> adapts and evolves. >>>> >>> >>> I agree. I have never been happy with the Boltzman brain argument >>> because it seems to assume that the probability distribution of >>> "spontaneous" BBs is independent of the complexity of the content of the >>> minds associated with those brains. I have been studying this relationship >>> between complexity or "expressiveness" of a B.B. My first guesstimation is >>> that there is something like a Zift's Law in the distribution: the more >>> expressive a BB the less chance it has to exist and evolve at least one >>> "cycle" of its computation. (After all, computers have to be able to run >>> one clock cycle to be said that they actually "compute" some program...) >>> >>> >>> >>>> The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and >>>> therefore it is far more probable to result in conscious computations such >>>> as ours than the case where the computation supporting your brain >>>> experiencing this moment is some initial condition of a very specific >>>> program. Certainly, those programs exist too, but they are much rarer. >>>> >>> >>> RIght, but how fast do they get rarer? >>> >> >> It's hard to say. We would have to develop some model for estimating the >> Kolmogorov complexity (and maybe also incorporate frequency) of different >> programs and their relation to a given mind. >> >> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the program >>>> corresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe. >>>> >>> >>> It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does to describe >>>> the physical system on which it is based. >>>> >>> >>> >>> How do you estimate this? >>> >> >> The UDA is a comparatively short program, and provably contains the >> program that is identical to your mind. Similarly, all of the known laws >> of physics could fit on a couple sheets of paper. QM seems to suggest that >> all possible solutions to certain equations exist, and so there is no need >> to specify the initial conditions of the universe (which would require much >> more information to describe than your brain). >> >> >>> Are you assuming that a lot of data can be compressed using symmetries >>> and redundancies. This looks like a Kolmogorov complexity/entropy... >>> >>> >> Somewhat. I think how frequently a program is referenced / instantiated >> by other non-halting programs may play a role. >> >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>> So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can interact >>>> with and affect the consciousness of other people. >>>> >>> >>> >>> From my reasoning, the appearance that we are "in the same universe" >>> is a by product of bisimilarities in the infinity of computations that are >>> each of us. In other words, there are many computations that are running >>> Stephen that are identical to and thus are the same computation to many of >>> the computations that are running Jason. >>> >> >> Yes. We would be programs instantiated within a (possibly but not >> necessarily) shared, larger program. >> >> >>> This gives an overlap between our worlds and thus the appearance of >>> a common world for some collection of "observers". >>> >> >> Right. >> >> >>> The cool thing is that this implies that there are underlaps; >>> computations that are not shared or bisimilar between all of us. >>> >> >> Yes, I agree. In some branches of the MW, perhaps you were born but I >> was not, or I was, and you weren't. >> >> >>> COuld those be the ones that we identify as "ourselves"? >>> >>> >>> >> >> Personal identity can become a very difficult subject, since there may be >> paths through which my program evolves to become you, and vice versa. >> >> Jason >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to [email protected]. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. 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