Dear Jason,

Interleaving below.

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:20 PM, Jason Resch <> wrote:

> On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 6:03 PM, LizR <> wrote:
>> On 28 December 2013 11:55, Stephen Paul King 
>> <>wrote:
>>> Hi LizR,
>>>    That is what is not explicitly explained! I could see how one might
>>> make an argument based on Godel numbers and a choice of a numbering scheme
>>> could show the existence of a string of numbers that, if run on some
>>> computer, would generate a description of the interaction of several
>>> actors. But this ignores the problems of concurrency and "point of view".
>>> The best one might be able to do, AFAIK, is cook up a description of the
>>> interactions of many "observers" -each one is an intersection of infinitely
>>> many computations, but such a description would itself be the content of
>>> some observer's point of view that assumes a choice of Godel numbering
>>> scheme.
>>>   Something doesn't seem right about this!
>>> It seems to suggest "multi-solipsism" or something along those lines -
>> which doesn't make it wrong, of course.
>> I await Bruno's answer with interest. I think he has already said
>> something about this, but I don't recall it being satisfactory, at least to
>> my limited understanding.
> I am also interested to hear what Bruno has to say.  My perspective is
> that most of the computations that support you and I are not isolated and
> short-lived "computational Boltzmann brains" but much larger, long-running
> computations such as those that correspond to a universe in which life
> adapts and evolves.

I agree. I have never been happy with the Boltzman brain argument because
it seems to assume that the probability distribution of "spontaneous" BBs
is independent of the complexity of the content of the minds associated
with those brains. I have been studying this relationship between
complexity or "expressiveness" of a B.B. My first guesstimation is that
there is something like a Zift's Law in the distribution: the more
expressive a BB the less chance it has to exist and evolve at least one
"cycle" of its computation. (After all, computers have to be able to run
one clock cycle to be said that they actually "compute" some program...)

>  The starting conditions for these is much less constrained, and therefore
> it is far more probable to result in conscious computations such as ours
> than the case where the computation supporting your brain experiencing this
> moment is some initial condition of a very specific program. Certainly,
> those programs exist too, but they are much rarer.

RIght, but how fast do they get rarer?

> They appear in the UD much less frequently than say the program
> corresponding to the approximate laws of physics of this universe.

 It takes far more data to describe your brain than it does to describe the
> physical system on which it is based.

How do you estimate this? Are you assuming that a lot of data can be
compressed using symmetries and redundancies. This looks like a Kolmogorov


> So we are (mostly) still "in the same universe", and so we can interact
> with and affect the consciousness of other people.

>From my reasoning, the appearance that we are "in the same universe" is a
by product of bisimilarities in the infinity of computations that are each
of us. In other words, there  are many computations that are running
Stephen that are identical to and thus are the same computation to many of
the computations that are running Jason.
  This gives an overlap between our worlds and thus the appearance of a
common world for some collection of "observers". The cool thing is that
this implies that there are underlaps; computations that are not shared or
bisimilar between all of us. COuld those be the ones that we identify as

> Jason
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Kindest Regards,

Stephen Paul King

Senior Researcher

Mobile: (864) 567-3099

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