Dear Bruno,

On Fri, Dec 27, 2013 at 11:11 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > On 25 Dec 2013, at 18:40, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: > > Are we not presuming, structure, or a-priori, existence of something, > doing this processing, this work? > > > > In the UDA we assume a "Turing universal", or "sigma_1-complete" physical > reality, in some local sense. > Could this "Turing universal/sigma_1-complete in a local sense" be the exact criteria required to define the observations 3-experiences of individuals or is it the 1-experiences of individuals (observers) in keeping with the definition of an observer as the intersection of infinitely many computations? > We need this to just explain what is a computer, alias, universal machine, > alias universal number (implemented or not in a physical reality). > Note that we do not assume a *primitive physical reality*. In comp, we are > a priori agnostic on this. The UDA, still will explains that such > "primitiveness" cannot solve the mind-body problem when made into a > dogma/assumption-of-primitiveness. > It has always seemed to me that UDA cannot solve the mind-body problem strictly because it cannot comprehend the existence of "other minds". > > Then in AUDA, keeping comp at the meta-level, I eliminate all assumptions > above very elementary arithmetic (Robinson Arithmetic). > > The little and big bangs, including the taxes, and why it hurts is derived > from basically just > > Kxy = x > Sxyz = xz(yz) > > or just > > x + 0 = x > x + s(y) = s(x + y) > > x *0 = 0 > x*s(y) = x*y + x > > > > > > Idea-wise, Wolfram and Von Neumann's cellular automata, also known as > programs. > > > I cannot parse this sentence. > > > > > I am not saying there is a programmer (like Herr Doctor Scmidhuber has > pondered) but there seems to be a pre-existing program, producing your > Arithmetic. > > > > ? > > I assume arithmetic. No more than any scientists. I define programs in > arithmetic. I don't define arithmetic in programs. > > We need to assume a sigma_1 complete reality, as we cannot get them from > less. But to reason further, and extracts the big bangs from arithmetic, we > need to define in RA, the notion of observers, reason, and this is done in > the usual mathematical manner, which happens, for computer science, to be > entirely build in term of numbers relations and functions, some > describable, some not, in arithmetical sentences. > > > > > > Platonism is great, > > > > Platonism is a theorem in arithmetic, once you bet that it exists a level > of description of yourself where you are Turing emulable. > > But the arithmetical realism used by comp is a far weaker hypothesis: it > is just the hypothesis that the elementary closed arithmetical sentences, > like Ex(x+1=2), are true, or false. It is assumed by 99,9999% of scientists. > > This is very important spudboy, I am just a humble logician which says > that if you believe that you can survive with a digital brains (physical, > if you want), then physics becomes a sub-branch of computer science, which > is already (although not so well known) a branch of number theory. > > Mechanism has been a long time ally to materialism, but the discovery of > the universal machine illustrates that mechanism is more an ally of the > "question to king Milinda" or to Neoplatonism. > > > > > but I am doubtful that the magic of self organization can come up with > forms all on its own. > > > > It cannot happen from just logic and addition. > It cannot happen from just logic and multiplication. > It happens from the conjunction of logic, addition and multiplication. > > > > > > > > > Before the chicken came the animal that preceded the chicken-maybe a > raptor, forget the egg. > > > The comp TOE, isolated through UDA and the AUDA, assumes the less. The TOE > is already taught in elementary school. > I have never heard one parent complaining of any form of brainwashing, or > propaganda when taught in elementary mathematical propositions, so I think > that doubting arithmetical realism is just obscurantist obstructive type of > bad faith, and it hides the fact that comp leads to Platonism, in the > philosophical or metaphysical, or theological, sense. > > I am a scientist. I put the assumption on the table. They are quite weak, > and I reason from there. > > You seem to ignore the relations between computer science and arithmetic, > but this is standard in theoretical computer science. > You seem to assume a primitive physical universe, but the UDA shows that > this does not even make sense, in case the comp substitution level exist. > > You need to convince yourself by following the reasoning, and study a bit > of computer science. A tiny part of the arithmetical reality contains the > whole of the computable, and the arithmetical reality is vaster as it > "knows" about the termination or non termination of algorithm or class of > algorithms, etc. The observers are emulated in that tiny parts of > arithmetic, but what is true about them and about their experiences extends > the whole arithmetical, the whole analytical, and even quite > plausibly/arguably the whole mathematical (in the current sense of > mathematical). > > I am not proposing anything new, just pointing on the incompatibility > between mechanist and materialist cognitive sciences, and showing how > computer science translates the mind-body problem into a body belief > problem in arithmetic. The conversation with the Lôbian machine is just > the beginning of the solution, in the most ideal case. > > Bruno > > > > > > > -----Original Message----- > From: Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> > To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> > Sent: Wed, Dec 25, 2013 6:18 am > Subject: Re: Bruno's mathematical reality > > > On 22 Dec 2013, at 20:04, spudboy...@aol.com wrote: > > Your theory comes from Von Neumann, and Chaitin, and Wolfram, does it not, > Edgar? That everything is a program or cellular automata, and "in the > beginning was a program." Following along, what is this Logic comprised of > (sort of like SPK's query) is it electrons, is it virtual particles, is it > field lines? Where doth the logical structure sleep? In Planck Cells? I > apologize if my questions annoy, but where is the computer network that > computes the current state of the universe. > > > In the arithmletical reality which probably emulates all computations > (in the standard sense of computer science). > > But the Wolfram theory is incorrect, as it assumes comp, and don't take > the FPI into account (nor even the quantum one). > > Bruno > > > > Can we get MIT physicist Seth Lloyd to shake a stick or a laser pointer, > or otherwise, display, where this abacus dwells? > > Thanks, > Mitch > -----Original Message----- > From: Stephen Paul King <stephe...@charter.net> > To: everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com> > Sent: Sun, Dec 22, 2013 1:36 pm > Subject: Re: Bruno's mathematical reality > > Dear Edger, > > Where does the "fire" come from that animates the "logic"? > > > On Friday, December 20, 2013 6:52:54 PM UTC-5, Edgar L. Owen wrote: >> >> All, >> >> The fundamental nature of reality is examined in detail in my recent >> book on Reality available on Amazon under my name. >> >> Marchal is on the right track, but reality consists not just of numbers >> (math) but is a running logical structure analogous to software that >> continually computes the current state of the universe. Just as software >> includes but doesn't consist only of numbers and math, so does reality. In >> fact the equations of physical science make sense only when embedded in a >> logical structure just as is the case in computational reality. >> >> Modern science has a major lacuna, the notion that all of reality is >> mathematical, that prevents science from grasping the complete nature of >> reality. In truth all of reality is logical, as is software, and the >> mathematics is just a subset of the logic. After all, modern science with >> its misguided insistence that all of reality is mathematical, has had >> nothing useful to say about the nature of either consciousness or the >> present moment, the two most fundamental aspects of experience. However I >> present a computational based information approach to these in my book >> among many other things. >> >> The second clarification that needs to be made to the post on Marchal's >> work is that human math and logic are distinct from the actual math and >> logic that computes reality. The human version is a generalized and >> extended approximation of the actual that differs from the actual >> logico-mathematical structure of reality in important ways (e.g. infinities >> and infinitesimals which don't actually exist in external reality). >> >> I can explain further if anyone is interested, or you can read about it >> in my book... >> >> Edgar Owen >> >> -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to a topic in the > Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this topic, visit > https://groups.google.com/d/topic/everything-list/sqWzozazMg0/unsubscribe. > To unsubscribe from this group and all its topics, send an email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. > -- Kindest Regards, Stephen Paul King Senior Researcher Mobile: (864) 567-3099 stephe...@provensecure.com http://www.provensecure.us/ “This message (including any attachments) is intended only for the use of the individual or entity to which it is addressed, and may contain information that is non-public, proprietary, privileged, confidential and exempt from disclosure under applicable law or may be constituted as attorney work product. 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