On 31 December 2013 07:44, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote: > On 12/30/2013 2:07 AM, LizR wrote: > > On 30 December 2013 21:02, Stephen Paul King > <[email protected]>wrote: > >> Dear Bruno, >> >> Why do you not consider an isomorphism between the Category of >> computer/universal-numbers >> and physical realities? That way we can avoid a lot of problems! >> I think that it is because of your insistence of the Platonic view >> that the material/physical realm is somehow lesser in ontological status >> and the assumption that a timeless totality = the appearance of change (and >> its measures) is illusory. I would like to be wrong in this presumption! >> >> The problem is that assuming the material / physical realm as > fundamental gets you no further than assuming that "God did it!" It's a > "shut up and calculate" (or shut up and pray) ontology. > > With materialism you just have a "brute fact" - well, maybe that's it, > maybe there *is *just a brute, unexplained fact. But us ape descended > life forms like to look for explanations even beneath the apparent brute > facts! > > > But "Everything happens" is just as useless as "God did it". A theory > that can explain anything fails to explain at all. > > It can't explain *anything*. It just says that all outcomes of the laws of physics are instantiated. This requires less information than saying that a specific outcome of the LOP is instantiated, assuming the LOP allow more than one outcome.
But I feel that you must already know this. Are you just being Devil's Advocate, or do you honestly not see the usefulness of multiverse theories? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to [email protected]. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
