On 31 December 2013 07:44, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

>  On 12/30/2013 2:07 AM, LizR wrote:
>  On 30 December 2013 21:02, Stephen Paul King 
> <stephe...@provensecure.com>wrote:
>>  Dear Bruno,
>>    Why do you not consider an isomorphism between the Category of 
>> computer/universal-numbers
>> and physical realities? That way we can avoid a lot of problems!
>>    I think that it is because of your insistence of the Platonic view
>> that the material/physical realm is somehow lesser in ontological status
>> and the assumption that a timeless totality = the appearance of change (and
>> its measures) is illusory. I would like to be wrong in this presumption!
>>  The problem is that assuming the material / physical realm as
> fundamental gets you no further than assuming that "God did it!" It's a
> "shut up and calculate" (or shut up and pray) ontology.
>  With materialism you just have a "brute fact" - well, maybe that's it,
> maybe there *is *just a brute, unexplained fact. But us ape descended
> life forms like to look for explanations even beneath the apparent brute
> facts!
> But "Everything happens" is just as useless as "God did it".  A theory
> that can explain anything fails to explain at all.
> It can't explain *anything*. It just says that all outcomes of the laws
of physics are instantiated. This requires less information than saying
that a specific outcome of the LOP is instantiated, assuming the LOP allow
more than one outcome.

But I feel that you must already know this. Are you just being Devil's
Advocate, or do you honestly not see the usefulness of multiverse theories?

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